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Preface 
 
 
 
Russia's economy has shown rapid development in recent years. Consumer food expenses 
have doubled over the last three years. The country - a market of 143 million consumers - 
is one of the largest importers of agricultural and food products in the world. Furthermore, 
the agri-food sector is in a process of being reconstructed. Russia therefore offers many 
opportunities for the outward-oriented Dutch agri-food sector. 
 In their eagerness to know more about the future perspectives for Dutch agro exports 
and investments, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) through its 
Agricultural Counselor in Moscow, requested Wageningen University and Research 
Centre (Wageningen UR) to conduct an analysis of ongoing trends in Russian agriculture, 
including possible scenarios for future developments in the agro-food sector and the 
implications thereof for the opportunities of Dutch Agribusiness. 
 The authors of the report are Siemen van Berkum and Pim Roza of LEI-Wageningen 
UR and John Belt of Wageningen International (WI-Wageningen UR). One approach 
taken by the Wageningen UR researchers was to interview a range of Dutch entrepreneurs, 
representing different agro sectors, asking them about their experiences in doing business 
with and in Russia. The authors gratefully thank the interviewees who readily and openly 
gave their views and opinions. Special thanks to Eugenia Serova and her staff of the 
Institute for Economy in Transition (IET) in Moscow for contributions in the form of 
background papers and executing a survey on Russian entrepreneurs in the agri-food 
sector. The Agricultural Counselor in Moscow - Mr. Marinus Overheul - is much 
appreciated for his substantive and practical assistance throughout the duration of the 
study. 
 
 
 
Dr. J.C. Blom 
Director General LEI  
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Summary 
 
 
 
Russia's robust economic growth after a decade of decline 
The Russian economy showed significant growth rates in recent years. The last three years 
consumer expenditures on food and beverages have doubled. The country is one of the 
largest net-importers of agricultural and food products in the world. At the same time, 
huge public and private investments support the sector increasing its production and 
improving its productivity and efficiency levels. The Russian market therefore offers many 
opportunities to the outward-oriented Dutch agribusiness. 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by a period of general 
economic decline in the Russian Federation. Production levels in the primary agricultural 
sector and its related upstream and downstream industries went also down, in some sub-
sectors even halved. The agricultural sector revived only after the economic and financial 
crisis in 1998. Following a significant devaluation of the ruble the position of domestically 
produced commodities and products strengthened against foreign competition. Moreover, 
the regeneration of economic growth led to a substantial rise in income per capita and 
increased domestic demand for food and beverages.  
 
Structural features and developments 
Structural features of the Russian agricultural sector are highly varied: farms with over 
5,000 hectares next to millions of smaller farms to very small household plots, the latter 
producing mainly for own consumption. Next to the feature of sizes, there is also much 
diversity in legal structures, such as state farms, joint stock companies, agricultural 
cooperatives, family farms and (still some) state farms. A rather new phenomenon is the 
agroholding or vertical integration, whereby the ownership and financing of the primary 
production is in hands of the processing or trading 'mother' company, or in hands of 
companies outside the agri-food chain. Such vertical integration is found in the cereals and 
oilseeds sectors, and also in intensive livestock farming.  
 The upstream and downstream industries are highly fragmented, with some players 
dominating regional markets, and hardly companies operating at a national scale. Regional 
concentration of the agribusiness activities are in the Western part of the country, where 
two-thirds of total domestic product is generated. Consolidation of agro-related 
(processing and supplying) firms occurs, but the speed of the process is much faster in the 
food distribution and retail sector. Especially in the larger cities the retail chains expand 
very rapidly. The largest retail companies are mainly Russian, with several foreign chains 
operating at the Russian market.  
 
Trade and foreign investment relations 
Russia's overall trade balance has greatly improved in the last ten years, mainly due to high 
export prices for oil and natural gas. In agricultural trade, however, Russia has a deficit. 
Major imported product categories are meat (poultry, beef and pork) and fruits. Brazil, 
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Ukraine, Germany and the USA are Russia's major foreign suppliers of agricultural 
products. Exports from the Netherlands - among the top-10 of agricultural suppliers in 
Russia - are increasing since 1999. Main product categories are cut flowers and plants, 
fruits, animal feed, vegetables and meat. The Dutch agribusiness sector also supplies a 
wide variety of goods and services as inputs to the agricultural and food industry in Russia. 
 Foreign investment in Russia has been rapidly increasing since 1999, pushed by the 
boosting oil and gas industry. Foreign investments in the Russian food and agricultural 
sector are however rather small in recent years: around 3% of total foreign investments. In 
some years (1998, 2000 and 2001) FDI in the food industry exceeded FDI in the oil and 
gas industry. But compared to several other Central and Eastern European countries the 
current food sector share in total FDI of Russia is low. Russia's business climate is not 
particularly attractive to foreign investors, as is pointed out by the country's ranking on 
lists indicating the ease of doing business and the perception of corruption.  
 
Main drivers of developments in Russia's agri-food sector 
Overall economic growth in Russia has been a major driver of the agribusiness 
developments in recent years. Through increased living standards, demand for food and 
beverages went up as well as the demand for more varied, convenience and quality 
products. Consumers' spending on food increases very rapidly and food is increasingly 
bought in modern supermarkets. In order to respond to market developments, the Russian 
agricultural and food industry needs investments in technology developments (both 'hard 
ware' - machinery, etc. - and 'soft ware' - knowledge and skills) aiming at improving 
productivity levels and quality of produce. Foreign direct investment may facilitate the 
restructuring and modernisation of the sector but the inflow is still rather low. Government 
support programs, largely through providing loans and credit subsidies, play a crucial role, 
yet these measures may not be very effective if accompanying policy reforms with respect 
to the financial sector and public administration are not carried through. Further policy 
reforms may be imposed by Russia's future membership of the WTO, also an important 
determinant of the economic developments in the years to come. Yet, as average import 
tariffs are low, expected tariff reductions will be modest and reductions implemented only 
after a transition period, the effects of Russia's WTO membership on agricultural imports 
will be neither immediate nor dramatic.  
 
Future expectations 
Model projections by organisations like OECD, FAO, FAPRI and LEI all indicate that 
agricultural production in Russia will increase in the next ten years, but in general not 
enough to cover the expected growth in food demand. These projections imply that Russia 
will remain a net-importer of all major agricultural commodities except for cereals and 
oilseeds. Interviews with Russian agribusiness' representatives and other experts indicate 
that the majority of entrepreneurs have very positive market expectations: economic 
growth will sustain and lead to increasing demand for their products. Also, they expect that 
government policies with respect to the agricultural sector, especially the investment 
support measures, will help to strengthen the raw material base of the sector.  
 Interviews with Dutch companies (already) producing in Russia and/or exporting to 
the country point at the many business opportunities these companies identify. Businesses 
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operating at markets of consumer-ready products build there optimism on the expected 
continuation of increased living standards. Next, the Russian agricultural sector benefits 
from much public and private investment, aimed at increasing production and productivity 
levels, especially (but not exclusively) in the livestock sector. This offers Dutch companies 
supplying agricultural inputs many business opportunities. 
 Of course, such opportunities will only be fully used under the condition of 
continued economic growth, the further opening up of Russian borders as a result of WTO 
membership and full compliance to consistent and stable trade rules, and the 
accompanying policy reforms aimed at improving the general business climate in the 
country. Presently there is a high level of government interventions - bureaucracy - and the 
opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking. Public administration reforms aimed at 
reducing these obstacles for investment are necessary conditions for sustained growth of 
the Russian economy. 
 
Some recommendations for potential Dutch investors 
Following the continuous threat of increasing trade barriers, but also because of chances in 
an expanding market, Dutch companies with interest for Russia are recommended to 
consider local investments and production. Operating in Russia, however, requires 
adjustment to local circumstances and culture. For instance, the Russian language is 
difficult and the Russians appear preferring to deal with 'own people'. For that reason, 
especially the small and medium-sized companies need support of a reliable Russian 
partner, if only because of dealing with the country's proverbially bureaucracy. A potential 
investor needs to look carefully for the right partner and well-qualified local staff. A first 
step is, however, to (let) carry out market research and decide which activities one would 
like to do in Russia and where. To operate successfully one needs good working contacts 
with local and regional authorities, for instance to anticipate legal changes. For Dutch 
companies considering starting up business or for those already operating in and with 
Russia, the Dutch agricultural attaché is very important in terms of trouble shooter, net 
worker and information desk. 
 12 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
Recent developments in Russia indicate of continued economic growth, increasing 
purchasing power and investments, and consolidation of political-administrative systems. 
These developments give rise to a reassessment of the Dutch business opportunities and its 
strategies for the medium term. Such an assessment should be based on a realistic 
projection of the developments in the Russian agri-food supply chain (primary agriculture, 
upstream and downstream industries).  
 Given that there are considerable uncertainties on issues affecting demand for and 
supply of agricultural and food products in Russia, there is a need for detailed insight into 
the drivers of future developments, such as economic growth, population, technology, 
policies with respect to agriculture and trade. Economic development has been positive in 
recent years, increasing the demand for food. Also, being an important exporter of fossil 
fuels the Russian government is benefiting from the present high energy prices through 
increasing export revenues and taxes. These developments provide the government with 
extra financial means. According to government plans a part of these means will be 
invested with priority in primary agriculture and processing of agricultural raw material. 
Russia has an impressive area of fertile land and much potential to play an increasing role 
in the region's food supply and general economic welfare, as well as in international 
agribusiness. Dutch companies already present in the country are aware of these potentials. 
Major challenge for policy makers is to facilitate the business community to exploit 
Russians agricultural potential efficiently. 
 Research into market opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness is highly relevant to 
the Ministry of Agriculture Nature and Food Quality (MLNV). The Ministry aims at 
facilitating the Dutch agribusiness in their process of strengthening their competitiveness 
at the domestic and the international market (see MLNV, 2005). The Dutch agri-food 
sector is strongly outward-oriented, either through exports or through foreign direct 
investments. Russia is a large market with large potential to expand business activities. 
The recent positive socio-economic and political developments give rise to further 
investigation into the business opportunities for Dutch agri-food companies in Russia. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
The objective of this research project is to present a realistic impression of the present state 
of and the prospects for the agricultural sector in Russia in the medium term (up to 2015), 
taking into account uncertainties with respect to socio-economic and political scenarios. 
The analysis contributes to an assessment of Dutch agri-food business opportunities in 
Russia. 
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1.3 Approach and structure of the study 
 
The research approach is a mixture of literature review, analyses of international 
databases, and expert interviews. The study comprises of the following steps. 
 First, literature review and secondary data help sketching recent developments in the 
Russian economy. Also, the role of agriculture in the general economy is discussed 
(chapter 2). Next, structural features of the agri-food supply chain are presented, together 
with performance indications (chapter 3). This part is followed by a description and 
analysis of recent trends in trade and foreign investment relations (chapter 4). Such 
analysis gives a first impression of the country's comparative advantages in agriculture and 
the country's attractiveness towards foreign investors in the agri-food supply chain.  
 Then, possible future developments in Russian agri-food markets are assessed 
(chapter 5). This part is build up by several elements. It starts off by discussing a number 
of factors determining developments in the Russian agri-food sector for the years to come. 
In presenting these factors, also uncertainties with respect to these factors are considered. 
Then, quantitative projections of the future development of the Russian agri-food cluster 
are presented, both from the literature and from own model simulations. The foregoing 
analyses are supplemented by the outcome of interviews with a wide range of Russian and 
Dutch entrepreneurs. Following this picture of the future, the business opportunities for 
Dutch companies are identified (chapter 6). These assessments as well as 
recommendations for improving the role of the Dutch government to successfully use the 
opportunities identified, are discussed during a workshop with Dutch companies. Remarks 
and suggestions made during that workshop are integrated in the final version of this 
report. 
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2. A general overview of the Russian economy 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Russia is the largest country in the world. Due to unfavorable climatic and soil conditions, 
only 13% of the country's territory is used as agricultural land. Agricultural activities are 
concentrated in the 'European' part of the Russian Federation, in the North-West, Central, 
South, Volga and (partly) Urals Federal Districts (see figure 2.1). The other two districts, 
Siberia and the Far East are relatively remote, mainly because of the local climatic 
conditions. Moscow and Saint-Petersburg are the most important cities and the two main 
economic centers of the country. Total Russian population amounts to 142.8 million (2006 
data from Rosstat) and is slowly decreasing. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Russia 
in 2005 was USD763.7 billion (World Bank Development Indicators 2006). This makes 
Russia the 14th largest economy in the world, just after India and Mexico.1 Together with 
Brazil, India and China, Russia is often seen as a high potential economy, which could 
become a much larger force in the world economy than it is now (see also Wilson and 
Purushothaman, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Federal districts of Russia  
Source: http://fp6.hse.ru/images/map_russia.gif. 
                                                 
1 In comparison: the Netherlands, with a GDP of USD594.8 billion, was the 16th largest economy in the 
world in 2005. 
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 This chapter outlines the main features of the macro-economic situation in the 
Russian Federation, as well as the relative contribution of the agricultural sector to the 
economy. Section 2.2 presents an economic overview, with some macroeconomic 
indicators and figures on the labor market, the position of the ruble and external trade. In 
section 2.3 the regional income distribution is discussed, which shows that income 
distribution in Russia is highly uneven. Section 2.4 deals with the role of agriculture in the 
Russian economy. 
 
 
2.2 General economic overview 
 
The Russian Federation has abundance of national resources (gas, oil, metals and forests 
(wood)). With a population of 143 million people the country also has a large consumer 
market. However, it is only since 1999 that Russia experiences a relatively steady 
economic growth. In the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 
1991 the economic situation worsened. 1997 Was the first year with economic growth in 
post-Soviet Russia. The financial crisis in 1998 caused, however, a significant economic 
downturn: the Russian ruble lost 70% of its value and GDP decreased with 5.3%. The 
recovery of the Russian economy already came one year after this crisis, when GDP 
increased with 6.4%. Since 2001 the Russian GDP has experienced a relatively steady 
growth (4-7%) compared to the 1997-2000 period, partly thanks to structural reforms 
carried out to transform the country into a market economy.  
 In 2000 GDP growth reached a record level of 10%, while in the last five years GDP 
growth fluctuated between 4.5 and 7.5% (see figure 2.2). Russia's economic growth in the 
first years after the crisis was driven by terms-of-trade gains, caused by the devaluation of 
the ruble. Since 2000 growth is primarily driven by domestic demand, particularly private 
consumption, which is supported by a strong growth of real wages and pensions (see also 
figure 2.3). Another main driver of economic growth in the last few years is the high oil 
price. Since Russia is the largest gas producer and the second largest oil producer in the 
world, the country is one of the greatest beneficiaries of high energy prices. However, if 
Russia wants to sustain stable economic growth, the country will have to increase 
investments in infrastructure, education, etc. Figure 2.2 shows that investments in 2003-
2006 were in the range of 10 to 13% of GDP but a higher investment-to-GDP ratio is 
needed to keep up with other growing economies. For example, China achieved an average 
annual ratio of 39% over the period 2000-2005, while Russian investment levels were 18% 
in the same period. 
 The Russian economic growth rates compare favorably with those for the EU, 
including the new Member States, where annual GDP growth between 2001 and 2005 was 
not higher than 5.5%. On the other hand, Russia underperforms compared to other CIS-
countries, such as Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan (see table 2.1). In 2007 the other CIS-
countries than Russia are expected to face a slowdown in economic growth and a higher 
inflation, partly due to the repricing of gas imports from Russia. Compared to other 
emerging economies, such as Argentina, Brazil, China and India, real GDP growth in 
Russia is the lowest (OECD/FAO, 2006). 
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 In 2004 the Russian government set up a Stabilisation Fund to accumulate surplus 
revenues from high world oil prices and to sustain economic growth. The law establishing 
the Russian Stabilisation Fund was approved in December 2003. The fund's revenues 
accrue from several sources: a portion of the export duty on oil and petroleum products, 
part of the revenues from the severance tax on mineral resources, and a portion of the 
surplus of the federal budget at the beginning of the fiscal year. The threshold price is set 
at USD27 per barrel of Urals oil, above which revenues start accumulating in the 
Stabilisation Fund, while the government has the right to withdraw money if oil prices fall 
below the threshold level. The Russian federal budget for 2007 assumes an average oil 
price of USD61 per barrel (compared to USD40 in 2006). This means that USD34 per 
barrel will flow towards the Stabilisation Fund. Forecasts predict that the fund will hold 
USD160 billion at the end of 2007. In December 2006 the fund had assets of about USD83 
billion (BOFIT Russia Review, 12-2006). 
 
 
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
%
GDP growth Fixed investment growth  
Figure 2.2 Annual growth rates of Russian GDP and investment, 1997-2006  
Source: Rosstat, CBR. 
 
 
 CPI inflation in Russia is stabilising in recent years, although it is still very high 
compared to other (Eastern) European countries. During the 1998 crisis, inflation increased 
to 84% on an annual basis, but since then inflation rates have declined strongly, from 
36.5% in 1999 and 20.2% in 2000 to 10-15% in recent years. Due to increasing energy 
prices, high prices of services, housing and food products the inflation rate in 2005 was 
10.9%, still more than five times higher than the EU average. 
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Table 2.1 Real GDP growth and inflation in Russia and selected CIS and CEE countries 
 GDP growth Inflation 
 2004  2005 2006 a)  2007 a)  2004  2005 2006 a) 2007 a) 
CIS total  8.4  6.5  6.8  6.5  10.3  12.3  9.6  9.3 
Russia  7.2  6.4  6.5  6.5  10.9  12.6  9.7  8.5 
Belarus  11.4  9.3  7.0  4.5  18.1  10.3  7.9  9.0 
Georgia  5.9  9.3  7.5  6.5  5.7  8.3  9.6  6.0 
Kazakhstan  9.6  9.4  8.3  7.7  6.9  7.6  8.5  7.9 
Ukraine  12.1  2.6  5.0  2.8  9.0  13.5  9.3  13.5 
Central Europe  5.0  4.3  5.2  4.6  4.3  2.4  2.2  3.2 
Czech Republic  4.2  6.1  6.0  4.7  2.8  1.8  2.9  3.3 
Hungary  5.2  4.1  4.5  3.5  6.8  3.6  3.5  5.8 
Poland  5.3  3.4  5.0  4.5  3.5  2.1  0.9  2.3 
a) estimations. 
Source: IMF (2006). 
 
Labor market 
The economic growth has had a positive impact on the labor market in Russia: since the 
end of the 1990s unemployment has decreased and average wages have increased (see 
figure 2.3). During the economic crisis, official unemployment rates first increased from 
9.0% in 1997 to 13.2% in 1998, but since then the unemployment rate gradually decreased 
to 6.7% in 2006 (Rosstat, estimation). The development of the average level of wages is 
even more spectacular. Before the economic crisis average wages were about USD160 per 
month in 1997, but these fell sharply to USD108 in 1998 and USD62 in 1999. Since then, 
average wages have increased significantly to reach an average monthly wage of USD301 
in 2005, while preliminary figures show that wages have risen to USD423 per month in 
2006 (Rosstat). There is of course much deviation of the average figures in this huge 
country. Wages in the main economic regions of Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as in 
the main cities are much higher than in the rural areas. Similarly, in the Russia of today 
you will find a few multi-billionaires next to a large number of poor households.  
 
The position of the ruble 
To a certain extent, the recovery of the Russian economy is reflected in the development of 
the exchange rate of the ruble against the USD and the Euro: since 2004 there is an 
appreciation of the ruble against both currencies. However, between 1999 and 2002/2003 
there was a period of ruble depreciation. For the USD, 2002 marks a shift in exchange rate 
development. With the exception of 2005 the USD lost strength against the ruble, while 
the Euro only weakened in 2004/2005 (see figure 2.4). The adjustment to high oil prices 
(through the Stabilisation Fund) to avoid a 'Dutch disease'1 caused a (rapid) real exchange 
rate appreciation (for the Euro in 2004/2005 and for the USD in 2005/2006). This in turn 
                                                 
1 The term 'Dutch disease' was first coined to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the 
Netherlands (and the rise in unemployment that accompanied it) following the discovery of natural gas in the 
1960s. It is broadly understood as to denote the harmful economic consequences that may arise in certain 
conditions from the sudden increase of a country's wealth, following for example a natural gas discovery, a 
surge in export commodity prices or any other positive exogenous shock generating large foreign inflows. 
The strong appreciation of the real exchange rate generates competitive pressures on manufacturing tradable 
sectors, which, if too severe, can lead to deindustrialisation. These risks are particularly great if structural 
rigidities impede adjustment to the shift in the terms of trade (see also OECD, 2006a: 77). 
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will lead to a loss of competitiveness: exports will decrease, while imports will be 
stimulated. On the other hand, when oil prices will decrease and economic growth in 
Russia slows down, the ruble might depreciate, which will make imports more expensive.  
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Figure 2.3 Unemployment and average wage, 1996-2006 
Source: Rosstat, CBR. 
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Figure 2.4 Exchange rates of the Russian ruble against the USD and the Euro, 1999-2006  
Source: Rosstat, CBR. 
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Trade 
The booming international oil prices that promote economic growth (through increased 
export and income tax revenues and thus increased government expenditures) also 
improved the trade balance of the Russian Federation (see figure 2.5). The trade balance 
has been positive ever since 1996, but as a result of the quickly expanding gas- and oil-
exports the surplus at the trade balance doubled from USD60 billion in 2000 to USD120 
billion in 2005. In 2005 the value of exports was almost twice as large as the value of 
imports (USD245 billion against USD125 billion). 
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Figure 2.5 Export, import and trade balance, 1996-2006 (billion USD) 
Source: Rosstat, CBR. 
 
 
2.3 Regional income distribution  
 
At first sight, the regional income distribution in Russia is very unequal (see figure 2.6). 
Two thirds of Russia's GDP is generated by the western districts of the country (west from 
the Urals). About half of this is earned in the relatively small Central District, including 
Moscow City. The Volga and Urals Districts are the second and third most important 
economic regions. The largest district of Far East is the least important region, both in 
terms of GDP share and in terms of population share. Only in the North-West District 
(including Saint-Petersburg), the share of income is in proportion to the share of 
population and territory. 
 Another indicator of regional economic development is the relative importance of 
the food component in the average consumer basket. Generally, the share of food expenses 
in total consumer expenses decreases when income increases. There are considerable 
variations in purchasing power between the Russian regions (Ylä-Kojola, 2006). When the 
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seven districts1 are compared, the differences are relatively small, with a ratio between 
income and minimum food expenditure of 4.41 in the Southern District and 7.83 in the 
Central District. But table 2.2 shows that the differences are larger when the purchasing 
power is compared at regional level. The gap between the richest and poorest regions turns 
out to be huge, also in terms of average income and minimum food expenditure. 
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Figure 2.6 Regional distribution of population and GDP, 2005  
Sources: Rosstat (2005), figure in Ylä-Kojola (2006). 
 
 
 Table 2.2 shows the large variations in average income, from RUB24,240 
(approximately EUR710) in Moscow to RUB1,906 (EUR55) in the Republic of 
Ingushetia, which is almost 13 times lower. The price of a minimum food basket2 is 
highest in Koryaksky Autonomous Area in the northern part of the Far Eastern District 
(RUB3,504 or around EUR100), due to high costs of transportation and distribution. In the 
Republic of Tatarstan the minimum food expenditure is three times lower (RUB1,142). As 
a result of these large variations, the ratio between average income and minimum food 
expenditure also varies greatly, from 14.83 in Moscow to 1.35 in the Republic of 
Ingushetia. 
 
                                                 
1 Central, Volga, Urals, Siberia, Nort-West, South and Far East. 
2 The price of a set of basic food items. 
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Table 2.2 Purchasing power comparison of selected Russian regions 
Federal 
District 
Region Average monthly 
income per capita, 
RUBJuly 2005 
Price of 
minimum food 
basket, RUBAug 
2005 
Average monthly 
income divided by 
food basket 
expenditure 
Russia  7,874  1,344  5.86 
Central   10,744  1,372  7.83 
 Moscow  24,240  1,635  14.83 
Urals   9,312  1,416  6.58 
 Yamalo-Nenetsky  20,116  2,000  10.06 
North-West   8,607  1,472  5.85 
 St-Petersburg  12,080  1,478  8.18 
Volga   6,078  1,211  5.02 
 Samara  9,428  1,349  6.99 
 Republic of Tatarstan  7,109  1,142  6.22 
Siberia   6,500  1,331  4.88 
 Tomsk  8,155  1,311  6.22 
 Ust-Ordynsky Buryatsky  2,061  1,235  1.67 
Far East   8,845  1,860  4.75 
 Koryaksky  8,251  3,504  2.35 
South   5,368  1,218  4.41 
 Republic of Ingushetia  1,906  1,408  1.35 
Source: Ylä-Kojola (2006), figures from Rosstat (2005). 
 
 
 Ylä-Kojola (2006) also calculated the share of regional purchasing power relative to 
the total Russian purchasing power in order to define the major economically viable 
regions (table 2.3). Together the 10 richest regions (out of 88 regions) compose almost half 
of the total purchasing power. The explanation lies in the fact that the regions either have 
natural resources or they are commercial or financial centers. The cities Moscow and 
Saint-Petersburg are major transportation hubs, as well as political, commercial and 
financial centers. The Tumen, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Samara regions produce oil, 
while the Sverdlovsk region (together with Tumen and Samara) is very industrialized. The 
southern regions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Krasnodar Krai have the highest 
agricultural output. 
 
 
2.4 Role of agriculture and food industry in the Russian economy 
 
The agricultural and food sector plays a relatively marginal role in the Russian economy. 
The contribution to GDP decreased from 7.2% in 1997 to 5.0% in 2005 (table 2.4). At the 
same time the share of the industry sector decreased from 44.7% to 35.2%. The services 
sector gained economic importance: the share in GDP increased from 48.6% to 59.8% 
(World Bank, 2006b). Economic growth in the agricultural sector (including hunting and 
forestry) remained well below overall GDP growth for three consecutive years since 2002 
In 2001 economic growth in the agricultural sector was still 7.5%, but in 2004 1.4% and in 
2005 2.0%. Growth rates in the food processing industry were a little higher: 4.4% in 2004 
and 2005 (see further section 3.3 and 3.4). In 2005 agriculture was less profitable than in 
2004: this lead to decline in employment in the agricultural sector with 11.9%. 
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Agriculture's share of total employment decreased from 13.3% before the Ruble crisis to 
7.1% in 2005 (Rosstat; World Bank, 2006b). 
 
 
Table 2.3 Purchasing power comparison, richest regions (2005) 
Region Federal District Share of the regional purchasing power of the total 
Russian purchasing power a) 
RUSSIA   100 
1. Moscow Central   18.36 
2. Saint-Petersburg North-West  4.47 
3. Moscow region Central  4.15 
4. Tumen region Urals  3.40 
5. Sverdlovsk region Urals  3.25 
6. Rostov region South  2.86 
7. Republic of Tatarstan Volga  2.79 
8. Republic of Bashkortostan Volga  2.76 
9. Samara region Volga  2.66 
10. Krasnodar Krai South  2.64 
Total of 10 regions   47.34 
a) Combined regional purchasing power = population * (average personal income/price of food basket). 
Source: Ylä-Kojola (2006). 
 
 
Table 2.4 Key economic figures on the Russian agricultural sector 
  1997  1998 1999  2001  2003  2005 
Gross agricultural output (bln RUB) 309.2 304.4 606.1  962.6  1134.5  1501.0 
Contribution of agriculture to GDP (%)  7.2  6.5  7.4  6.6  6.2  5.0 
Share of employment in agriculture (%)  13.3  13.7  13.3  12.3  11.0  7.1 
Source: Rosstat. 
 
 
 In Russia consumers buy food items on open markets, street kiosks, small shops and 
increasingly in super and hyper markets of large retail chains. Not all of this is registered 
and part of the official economy. Yet, the value of the food and beverages market was 
estimated at EUR160 billion in 2005. This makes Russia the third largest market for food 
and beverages in Europe, after Germany and France. Current growth rates of the (official, 
registered) market are very high, at about 20-25%, mainly because of rising income levels. 
It is forecasted that in 2008-2010 the food and beverages market will be EUR250-350 
billion (PwC, 2007). 
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3. Structure and performance of the Russian agri-food 
sector 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overall picture of the structure of the Russian agri-food sector. 
During the communist period the state had a major influence on the economic process 
through its central planning philosophy and state-owned enterprises. In the early 1990s 
Russia made major economic and political changes and adopted a more market oriented 
economy policy. Economic liberalisation paved the way for rapid privatisation of state 
owned enterprises. Yet, state ownership still exists in the agricultural sector, although to a 
minor extent. This chapter describes the structure of all components of the agribusiness 
cluster, which includes the upstream and downstream industries, as well as the primary 
sector. In addition, the structures of the food retail sector are presented. 
 
 
3.2 Structural features of the upstream industries 
 
Studies providing a general overview indicate that most upstream industries supplying 
agricultural inputs are rather fragmented (e.g. Serova and Gardner, 2005; Serova and 
Shick, 2005). An example is the structure of the animal feed sector, with many local grain 
mills supplying livestock in their production area. Foreign investors are present too. 
Several feed producing Dutch companies such as Koudijs, Provimi and TrouwNutrion 
(Nutreco) have entered the market in the 1990s. These companies started exporting animal 
feed but later invested in local production in addition to their trading activities.  
 The structure of the Russian fertiliser manufacturing sector is slightly different, with 
a limited number of firms (less than 10) producing three quarter or more of total output of 
nitrogen and phosphate fertiliser. Also the Russian agricultural machinery industry is 
dominated by a limited number of companies: the production is mainly by large 
enterprises, such as Rostelmash, Agromashholding and Rostov Agricultural Machine-
Building plant. This industry produces a wide assortment of harvesting machinery, sowing 
machines, soil working equipment, tractors etc. However, the industry is said to be on the 
decline, having difficulties in competing with foreign suppliers such as German Claas and 
USA John Deer. Imports of agricultural machinery are estimated almost half of the market 
in money terms in 2005. The reason of the difficult state of national agricultural machine-
building industry is the absence of a clear system of produce distribution (e.g. dealer 
network), while in terms of efficiency and quality (technology) experts indicate that 
Russian manufactures should improve to retain competitive (Newslab, 2006).  
 The generally fragmented upstream industry should allow competitive trading in 
agricultural inputs. Yet, there may be regional (close to) monopolies due to government 
interventions. Although the government no longer delivers farm input it has a strong 
negative influence on input markets through a wide range of federal or regional support 
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programs (Serova and Gartner, 2005). Government-sponsored leasing programs, with their 
restrictions of approved suppliers and models, create severe obstacles to the development 
of dealer networks, and may affect input prices unintentionally and most often negatively. 
For instance, the cost-reimbursement policy for fertilisers only increased the demand for 
this input and encourages the export-oriented manufacturers to raise prices in the domestic 
market. Meanwhile, the agro-chemicals industry is slowly increasing production, 
recovering from the large decline in production levels during the 1990s. This industry is 
becoming export-oriented as domestic consumption is increasing only marginally (Serova 
et al., 2006a). 
 
 
3.3 Structures and performance trends at the primary level 
 
3.3.1 Structures 
 
The Russian agricultural production is organised in various forms. One important group is 
the 24,000 large farms, sprung from former cooperatives and state farms. These farms 
have on average 600 ha and employ 150 people. These farms have many different legal 
forms, such as agricultural cooperative, public limited company and partnership. Next 
there are still over 3,000 state farms and other large farms as part of Agrarholdings (see 
text box). At present these large farms use around two-thirds of the agricultural area in 
Russia. Still, the production share of these farms is around 40%. These large farms are 
mainly in crop production such as cereals and oilseeds, yet recently also increasingly in 
meat production (see figure 3.1 under the label of companies). 
 Next to the large farms there are around 30,000 smaller agricultural companies, 
farms with 60 employees and 260 ha on average. This category of farms uses around 7.8 
million ha (4% of total agricultural area). The number of these farms has increased since 
the mid-1990s. These farms are also mainly in crop production.  
 Another category of the Russian agricultural production is the private farmer. The 
number of farms is rather constant since the mid-1990s. These farms are typically 70 ha 
and are in crop production.  
 The biggest category of farmers is the family farms - around 15.5 million of these 
farms use around 8.6 million ha. These farmers often also use some area at the larger 
farms, so that on average the family farms use an estimated 2 ha (16% of total agricultural 
land). Traditionally these are livestock farms. Around half of cattle and pigs are held on 
these farms. Around 60% of meat production is on these farms. These farms largely 
produce for their own needs. 
 The main trend in the structure of the Russia's agriculture is severe polarisation of 
both large farming enterprises and small family farms (Serova et al., 2006a). Part of the 
producers are actively developing, modernizing and investing, while the other part is 
becoming more and more marginalised. However, for many reasons the latter units do not 
go bankrupt. Therefore, the latter part of the sector contributes to average indicators of the 
sector performance making them worse than they could be in the case of massive sinking 
of insolvent producers. 
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Figure 3.1 Share of business forms in the main agricultural products in Russia  
Source: ZMP, 2006. 
 
 
Agroholdings are a relatively new form of organisation in the Russian agriculture. These are vertically 
integrated companies, combining different stages in the production, processing and distribution of 
agricultural and food products. The number of these companies was around 150 in 2003 (ZMP, 2006). 
Established in the end of the 1990s after the financial crisis the first agroholdings were set up by processors 
and distributors to guarantee supply of raw material of good quality. Meanwhile also investors from other 
branches have discovered the agricultural operation as an attractive business. Next to companies from the 
industry and energy sector also banks and other financial organisations, big agricultural firms and the state 
are actively investing in agriculture. The average size of an agroholding is said to be around 50,000 ha, yet 
there also companies with much over 200,000 ha agricultural land. Still, the total area at these holdings is not 
exceeding 5% of all agricultural land. On the other hand, the share of production is higher than 5%. Next to 
the cereals and oilseeds production, agroholdings can be found in the rapidly increasing poultry and pig meat 
production (ZMP, 2006; Rylko and Jolly, 2005). These new farms are distinguished from the traditional farm 
enterprises not only by the scale of operation but also by the presence of significant investment inflows into 
primary agriculture from non-agricultural sources, adoption of new management style, new technology, 
strong profit-orientation and aggressive market behaviour.  
Box 3.1 Agroholdings, a new phenomenon 
 
 
3.3.2 Production, yields and farm financial performances 
 
An indication of the sector's performance is its production and yield developments. 
Agricultural production has fallen continuously during the period 1990-1998 and only 
returned to positive growth figures since then. By 2005 agriculture has recovered by 75% 
compared to the pre-reform level (see figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 Growth (in % annual change) in agricultural production, 1985-2006  
Source: Serova et al., (2006a). 
 
 
 Crop production is still more than half of agricultural output: 53% in 2005. Its share 
is, however, steadily decreasing. Crop production is very vulnerable and heavily depends 
on weather conditions and price situations. Grains remain the major crop in Russians 
agriculture and wheat is still the major cultivated cereal (see table 3.1). The structure of 
cereal production is unsteady from year to year, but one notable trend is a decrease of the 
share of traditional rye production and certain increase in the share of maize production. 
Both crops are, however, small compared to wheat and barley. The production of 
sunflower, sugar beet, vegetables and potatoes continued to growth and has now exceeded 
the pre-1991 output levels.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Key figures of Russian crop production (million ton) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Cereals  65.5  85.2  84.9  67.2  76.2  76.4 
Of which: wheat  34.5  46.9  50.6  34.1  45.4  47.6 
Barley  14.1  19.5  18.7  18.0  17.2  15.8 
             
Oilseeds  4.5  3.2  4.2  5.5  5.6  7.1 
Of which: sunflower seeds  3.9  2.7  3.7  4.9  4.8  6.3 
             
Sugar beets  14.1  14.6  15.7  16.9  19.0  19.1 
Potatoes  33.9  35.0  32.9  36.7  35.9  36.4 
Fruit  3.4  3.1  3.6  3.6  3.7   
Of which: apple  1.3  1.8  2.0  1.7  2.0  1.8 
Vegetables  13.0  13.7  13.4  15.3  15.7  15.2 
Of which:             
Cabbage  3.5  3.9  3.6  4.4  4.5  . 
Onions  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.6  1.6  . 
Carrots  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.7  1.8  . 
Source: ZMP-Agrarmärkte in Zahlen, Mittel- und Osteuropa (2006:220). 
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 For livestock production the situation is notably worse than in the crop production. 
Animal inventories continue to fall, output in major sub-sectors is either decreasing or 
marginally growing (Table 3.2). However, on the background of the general low rate of 
growth, some sub-sectors of this industry are recovering. In particular poultry meat 
production is increasing by growth rates of 10% or more each year in the period 2000-
2004. Pig meat production is also expanding over the last five years. In selected regions 
the growth in poultry and hog production in 2006 significantly exceeded the national 
average rate: in Moscow, Belgorod, Penza, Stavropol and Krasnoyarsk regions poultry and 
hog production increased by 130-160% in 2006. These regions emerge as specialised 
zones of livestock production. Similar dairy regions emerge with more intensive 
production and speedy growth of both output and yield per cow: for instance, while in the 
Soviet economy milk production was quite dispersed by territory, today just 7 regions 
provide one third of gross milk output and one fifth of the dairy industry is located in three 
regions (Moscow, St. Petersburg and Krasnodar kray) (Serova et al., 2006a). 
 
 
Table 3.2 Stocks and production figures of key animal sub-sectors 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Stocks (million head)             
Cattle  28.0  27.3  27.1  26.5  24.9  24.1 
Of which Cows  12.6  12.3  11.7  11.1  10.2  10.2 
Pigs  15.7  15.7  16.0  17.3  15.9  13.4 
Sheep  12.6  12.6  13.0  13.7  14.5  15.5 
Poultry (total)  348.8  336.8  341.6  343.2  346.0  334.7 
Production (1000 ton)             
Meat (total)  4,420  4,430  4,692  4,945  4,981  5,140 
Of which              
   Beef and veal  1,897  1,872  1,858  1,990  1,951  1,870 
   Pig meat  1,569  1,497  1,580  1,679  1,644  1,675 
   Sheep & goat meat  140  134  136  138  144  141 
   Poultry meat  755  862  935  1,030  1,152  1,130 
Cow milk  31,938  32,864  33,507  33,290  31,995  31,000 
Eggs  1,819  1,883  2,023  2,040  2,005  2,067 
Source: ZMP-Agrarmärkte in Zahlen, Mittel- und Osteuropa, 2006:219. 
 
 
 Productivity in terms of tonnes per hectare and yields per animal are still relatively 
low compared to international standards. For instance in the arable sector, cereals yields 
are 1.7-1.8 ton/ha in recent years, and soybean and sunflower yields around 1 ton/ha. EU-
15 average yields are 6-7 ton of wheat per ha and 1.5-1.7 ton sunflower per ha. Sugar beets 
and potatoes yields 25-30 ton/ha and 17-18 ton/ha respectively in Russia. This is 50% or 
less compared to Dutch yields where farmers produce per hectare 50-60 ton sugar beets 
and 40-45 ton potatoes. Milk yields in the Russian Federation increased to almost 3300 kg 
per cow in 2005. This is a significant improvement since 2000 (when yield per cow was 
only 2350 kg/year), but still only half of the average level in the EU-15.  
 These figures on yields show the generally low level of technology used in the 
Russian agriculture, explaining the low level of yields by the relatively low input use in the 
sector as well as the low quality of inputs used. For example, the majority of seeds used in 
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the crop sector are 'saved seeds', seeds that farmers simply save from the harvest of the 
previous year. These seeds are not improved in any way and this is one of the reasons why 
weather continues to be a major factor in production and fluctuations in yields. Similarly at 
the animal side, the genetic situation in livestock is relatively poor and would benefit much 
from further investments in breeding, while improvements in skills and knowledge of 
animal husbandry could also contribute to higher yields. Next, the use of fertilisers and 
feed concentrates is generally low, which in combination with less than optimal husbandry 
practices leads to yields that are low by international comparisons. At the same time, one 
has to note that there are huge differences in the country between farms and regions, 
depending on their size, their specialisation and natural circumstances, such as climate and 
soils (see e.g. Serova et al., 2006a; OECD, 2006b). Earlier in this section some regions 
specialising in agricultural production were mentioned. Generally, the indicators of output 
growth, yields and producers performance in these regions are (much) better compared 
with the rest of the country.  
 Since 1999 the financial state of the agricultural sector has been improving steadily: 
the share of insolvent farms reduced and the overall sector's net returns increased (Serova 
et al., 2006a; OECD, 2006b). Terms of trade for the sector improved during the period 
since 1998, except for 2002 when agricultural prices fell significantly for most farm 
products. Investments in the sector have increased. Two massive farm debt rescheduling 
were undertaken since the economic crisis in 1998. This also contributed much to the 
improvement of the financial state of the primary sector. In 2004, the share of financially 
valid agricultural enterprises surpassed 50%, while the share of enterprises with overdue 
debts steadily decreases to reach approximately 10% in summer 2006 (Serova et al., 
2006a). 
 
 
3.4 Trends in the processing industries structure and performance  
 
A major structural trend in the food industry of the last three to four years is a 
consolidation of assets: major companies of the sector tend to acquire the smaller players 
in the regions and/or merge with big(ger) companies (Serova et al., 2006a). Another 
significant trend in the food industry is vertical integration along the food chain. Under the 
severe fall in raw imports after the economic crisis of 1998 many processing and trading 
enterprises became interested in increasing ties with the domestic supplies of the primary 
agricultural products. However, they found that domestic markets were severely 
underdeveloped: collecting raw material is costly and coupled with high business risks. 
Therefore, many of these companies started to expand their business control over the 
primary farming sector, in most cases actively supported by regional and district 
authorities (Gatauline et al., 2006).  
 As in primary agriculture the situation across food sub-sectors is differentiated. 
Beverage, flour and bakery, confectionery and vegetable oil industries have been 
recovering and modernising most rapidly. Meat and dairy processing have felt longer 
demand constraints, but are catching up thanks to fast strengthening of consumer incomes. 
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The following paragraphs show in more detail the major structural characteristics of a 
number of food processing sub-sectors.1 
 
Dairy industry 
Currently there are 1700 dairy processors in Russia, ranging from small local operators to 
large national and multinational firms. The dairy industry is regionally fragmented, 
although there are some big enterprises or groups operating all over the country, the largest 
players are the local Wimm-Bill-Dann, which has 30 factories across Russia, the German 
Ehrman, French Danone, Dutch Campina, and Petmol owned by the Russian Unimilk. A 
dozen of large players control more than half of the market.2 Further consolidation is likely 
to take place, yet due to the size of the country, low population density and the weak retail 
network, local production with local brands is likely to continue even if the nationally 
operating giants dominate the scene. The latter are generally operating in the 'high-tech' 
dairy product segment, using Western technology and producing dairy products (milk 
drinks, yoghurts, desserts) positioned in the mid-priced to expensive market segments. The 
regional and local operating smaller companies focus on simple, natural products (generic 
milk, cheese, butter) without brands. 
 
Meat industry 
The meat processing sector is very fragmented. Regional companies have played a more 
important role than national companies. Cerkizovsky is the biggest meat processing 
enterprise in Russia with an estimated 10-12% market share in the processed meat sector. 
The holding company of Cherkizovsky, ZAO Ekotorg, unites more than 30 meat 
processing companies located in various Russian regions. Cherkizovsky is a vertically 
integrated holding, including farms and processing facilities. Tsaritsyno and Mikoyan are 
two main competitors of Cherkizovsky in the Moscow area, next to Camponos, the largest 
foreign-owned (Spanish) meat processing company in Russia. Major players in the St. 
Petersburg area are Severnaya, Parnas-M, Samson and Finnish PIT-Produkt. When 
evaluating the market share of the companies it is important to realise that processed meat 
accounts for up to a quarter of all meat consumed in Russia. Thus companies might have a 
big share in the processed meat segment, but the overall market share remains quite 
insignificant. 
 
Confectionery 
The confectionery industry includes a wide range of sugar-based sweets, all chocolate 
products and flour-based sweet products such as cookies, wafers and other long-shelf-life 
products. Traditionally, Russians spend a big proportion of their income in confectionery 
products. Foreign producers entered the market in the early 1990s, Nowadays, 
approximately 50-70% of the market is controlled by foreign companies, such as Mars, 
Nestle, Kraft Foods, Dirol-Cadbury, Perfetti Van Melle, Orkla and Danone. Successful 
local companies include Red October, Babayevskoe and Rot Front, which are united in 
one: United Confectionery.  
                                                 
1 Major information source for the industry structure is Ylä-Kojola, 2006. 
2 Taking into account that an estimated half of the milk production is sold and consumed unprocessed, 
implying that people buy raw milk from farms and open markets. 
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Bakery 
Traditionally the bread consumption is very high in Russia. Nowadays it is estimated that 
the bread consumption is decreasing, although some segments are growing rapidly inside 
the bakery, reflecting Russians changing habits and eating less traditional bread but instead 
more premium products (different kinds of buns, rolls and waffles with additional flavors 
and ingredients). This sector has a dual structure, with large and small bakeries, medium 
sized bakeries hardly exist. Small bakeries are popular in rural areas and sparsely 
populated areas. Large bakeries have a big share of a local or regional market - really big 
bakeries with national coverage do not exist yet. Some foreign companies are in the 
Russian market, such as Schulstad, Delifrance and Fazer. 
 
Potato 
The potato industry in Russia is still in its infancy. Russians love potatoes; they eat around 
130 kg/capita/year, approximately twice the consumption level in most West-European 
countries and the USA. They take them smashed, boiled and baked, in soup and pancakes, 
but sliced, fried and bagged is just catching on. For the latter, Russian's consumption per 
capita is less than 0.5 kg per year, while for instance the Dutch figure is almost 3 kg. There 
are only few companies operating in this market. Frito-Lay is market leader. This globally 
operating company - the snack food division of Pepsi-Cola - invested in a modern 
manufacturing facility in Kashira, 100 km south of Moscow, in 2001/2002, where it 
produces chips and other snacks. Next to Frito-Lay only a few domestic companies are on 
the market for potato (snacks) products.  
 
Performance of food industry 
The overall performance of the food industry has been rather positive since 1998: 
production growth has been around 5% annually. Yet, production growth has slowed down 
in 2004 and 2005. The 2005 production value is still about one quarter lower than the 
1990-level (see figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 Production growth (in % annual change) in the food industry  
Source: Serova et al., (2006a). 
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 Like various sub-sectors in agriculture, sub-sectors in the food industry demonstrate 
quite different trends. Production of some food commodities has exceeded the pre-reform 
level, such as vegetable oil (sunflower, rape seed) and white sugar. Other sub-sectors are 
quite close to pre-reform levels, such as cereal products and margarine. On the other hand, 
production levels in the dairy and meat sub-sectors are still quite far from what these 
sectors produced in 1990s. Yet the increasing trend in capital investments in the food 
industry indicates that many companies consider market opportunities positively. 
 Increasing sophistication of local food processors may imply increasing competition 
for some imports. But at the same time, (rapid) growth in domestic processing is creating 
opportunities for a wide range of food ingredient imports. Also, as the Russian economy 
improves and consumer incomes go up, processors are finding it necessary to source new 
and better ingredients to maintain market share. 
 
 
3.5 Retail and wholesale structures 
 
Russia is among world's fastest growing retail market thanks to seven straight years of 
strong economic expansion. In 2004, it was a USD1999 billion market, with food retail 
accounting for roughly USD90 billion according to official statistics (ATKearney, 2005).1 
GDP growth was nearly 7%, with retailers reporting a 36% growth rate over the previous 
year. The expanding market has caught attention of domestic and foreign food retailers. 
 The most visible sign of growth in the retail food sector has been the rapid 
introduction and expansion of Western-style supermarket chains. Several foreign retailers, 
including Metro, Spar, and Auchan, opened outlets several years ago and announced 
further expansion in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities. Carrefour opened an office 
in Moscow in 2003 (and already opened several hypermarkets in Moscow and in St. 
Petersburg). Other retailers including the German Rewe (Billa) and Edeka, and Turkish 
Migros Türk have entered the Russian market more recently (ZMP, 2005: 11). 
 Several local supermarket chains (Perekryostok, Sedmoi Kontinent, Pyaterochka and 
Kopeika) have all launched equally ambitious expansion plans. Some of them are entering 
neighboring CIS countries. Financing for many of these projects is coming from the 
Russian oil industry, which is looking for profitable ways to invest earnings. 
 Despite the rapid process of consolidation, the food retail is still highly fragmented: 
the top five grocery retailers - two western and three Russian chains - holds less than 9% 
of the market (ATKearney, 2005). Moscow and St. Petersburg have always been the 
richest and most sought after local markets. Yet, stiff competition in these highly 
concentrated retail markets and the desire to sustain growth rates force chains to expand 
into other regions, primarily the Northwest, South, Volga, Ural and Western Siberia. This 
is likely to focus on the (more than 10) Russian cities with a population in excess of 1 
million inhabitants, where modern retail outlets are to take a foothold. 
 The HRI (hotel, restaurant and institutional) sector is making an impressive come 
back as reflected in the growth of the fast-food outlets and mid-level restaurants 
                                                 
1 Official figures may underestimate the market as a major part - an estimated two-thirds according to ZMP 
(2005) - of food is still bought at open and covered over street markets, kiosks and small food shops.  
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(Taybakhtina, 2005). Among the fastest-growing chains are imports such as McDonald's 
and Sbarro, and some very successful local chains like Rostiks. While most fast-food 
franchises source food locally as much as possible to keep costs and prices down, a 
number of foreign-theme and upscale restaurants offer good potential for greater imports 
of high-end food products. 
 
 
3.6 Trends in consumption 
 
The average Russian family spends 35 to 40% of its disposable income on food and 
beverages. This share of food expenditure is high compared to many other European 
countries. For example in Poland, the figure is close to 29% and in the Czech Republic it is 
25% (Taybakhtina, 2005). 2004 Data indicate that consumers are spending most of their 
disposable income on meat products (10.5%) and bakery products (6.5%). Even though 
bread and bakery products are in general quite cheap, they are an essential part of the diet 
in Russia. Milk and dairy products are the third biggest food item consumers spend money 
on: 4.9% in 2004 (Ylä-Kojola, 2006). Table 3.3 shows some trends in the annual 
consumption per capita for some major food items since 1998. Consumption per capita is 
increasing as the comparison of 2004 with 1998 levels indicates. Only for beef and wheat 
consumption levels declined. Consumption of pork (since 2000) and chicken meat went up 
significantly, as consumption of tropical fruits (bananas, oranges, et cetera) and vegetables 
(cabbages, tomatoes) did. At the same time, consumption of major food items like fresh 
milk, potatoes and - to a lesser extent - wheat (80% of production is for human 
consumption, mainly bread) are relatively stable over time. Data for 2005 indicate an 
increase of all three types of meat (although beef consumption is still less than 1998 levels) 
and of dairy products (especially of cheese, estimated at 5.6 kg/capita; ZMP, 2006). 
 
 
Table 3.3 Consumption per capita of major agricultural commodities in Russia (kg/capita/year) 
  1998  2000  2002  2004 2004/1998
Bananas  3.2  3.4  4.4  6.0  84% 
Bird eggs (including hen eggs)  12.3  12.8  13.8  14.1  14% 
Bovine meat  19.9  15.2  17.7  16.3  -18% 
Cabbages and other brassicas  17.4  18.5  18.6  19.4  12% 
Cauliflowers and broccoli  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  47% 
Chicken meat  9.0  9.2  14.9  15.4  71% 
Milk, whole, fresh  172.6  169.0  171.4  182.5  6% 
Oranges  2.8  2.1  3.5  3.3  19% 
Pork  14.8  12.4  15.4  15.0  1% 
Potatoes  131.2  124.0  127.2  131.1  0% 
Tangerines, mandarins and clementines  0.9  0.8  1.1  1.7  88% 
Tomatoes  14.3  14.4  17.0  20.3  42% 
Wheat  133.2  130.3  137.1  114.7  -14% 
FAO, FAOstat statistics. 
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 Food consumption trends vary substantially between regions and income brackets. In 
rural areas and poorer regions products bought are mainly basic foodstuff. In bigger cities, 
where people with the higher income levels live, the food consumption pattern is more 
similar to Western Europe. Consumers have a wide variety of high-quality products to 
choose from and the demand for premium goods is increasing. In general Russian 
consumers appreciate quality and they are willing to pay for it. On the other hand they are 
also very price conscious and are not highly loyal to brands. Russians usually prefer local 
products, because they feel that these products are healthy, less likely to contain 
preservatives and better value for money (Ylä-Kojola, 2006). 
 With rising per capita income and an up- and-coming middle class consumer 
preferences may change rapidly. The share of the populating interested in better quality, 
more variety and convenience food is likely to increase quickly with changing 
consumption patterns in the years to come (see chapter 5). 
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4. Agricultural trade and foreign direct investment: trends 
and policies 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives a short overview of the current situation with respect to trade and 
foreign investment in Russia. Russian agricultural trade is discussed in section 4.2, 
including main trade policy issues and the WTO accession process. Section 4.3 deals with 
foreign investment, with a focus on the food and agribusiness sector.  
 
 
4.2 Russian trade  
 
4.2.1 Total Russian trade 
 
As already expressed in figure 2.5, Russia's overall trade balance has greatly improved in 
the last ten years. In 2006 (till November) total exports of goods amounted USD274.5 
billion, while imports were also considerable, with USD144.4 billion. Important 
contributor to the growth of foreign trade was the high price of gas and oil. In 2005 the 
Russian government collected revenues from foreign trade equivalent to 7.8% of GDP 
(mostly oil and gas export duties, which were increased considerably in 2004 and 2005) 
(IET, 2006). Russian exports are dominated by minerals, including crude oil and natural 
gas (65% in 2005), while metals and metal goods (13%), machinery, equipment and means 
of transportation (7%) and chemicals (6%) are also important export products. The export 
of food stuffs and agricultural raw materials made up only 2% of total exports. On the 
other hand, Russian imports in 2005 were more fragmented, with food stuffs and 
agricultural raw materials making up 17% of total imports (second most important 
category). Machinery, equipment and means of transport make up the largest category of 
imports (46%), while the import of chemicals (16%) and metal goods (7%) is also 
considerable (IET, 2006).  
 According to Rosstat figures, major sources of imports by Russia in 2004 and 2005 
were Germany and Ukraine (see table 4.1). Major destinations of Russian exports in these 
years were the Netherlands (mainly oil, gas and coal) and Germany. 
 As far as the geographic structure of Russia's foreign trade is concerned, its largest 
economic partner is the EU, with 52.1% of mutual trade turnover in 2005. The CIS-
countries (mainly Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) accounted for 15.1% (in 2004 
18.3%), the EurAsEC countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan) for 7.8% 
and the APEC countries1 for 16.2%. Within the EU, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy 
are Russia's main trade partners (IET, 2006). In 2005 mutual trade turnover (exports plus 
                                                 
1 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. This organisation promotes liberal trade and economic polices along 
the Pacific Rim. At present 21 countries are members. Russia is one of them. 
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imports) between Russia and the Netherlands was USD26.5 billion (up 159.4% against 
2004) (IET, 2006). Trade figures show the Netherlands has a negative trade balance with 
the Russian Federation. In 2005 total exports from the Netherlands amounted EUR4.3 
billion, while total Dutch imports from Russia amounted EUR8.3 billion. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Major import and export partners of the Russian Federation in 2004 and 2005 
Imports by 
Russia 
Share in 2004 
(%) 
Share in 2005 
(%) 
Exports from 
Russia 
Share in 2004 
(%) 
Share in 2005 
(%) 
Germany  14.0  13.5 Netherlands  8.4  10.2 
Ukraine  8.1  7.9 Germany  7.3  8.2 
China  6.3  7.4 Italy  6.7  7.9 
Belarus  8.6  5.8 China  5.6  5.4 
USA  4.2  4.6 Ukraine  5.9  5.1 
Italy  4.2  4.5 Belarus  6.2  4.2 
Source: Rosstat. 
 
 
4.2.2 Russian agricultural trade1 
 
Unlike the highly positive overall trade balance, Russia has a large trade deficit in 
agricultural trade. In 2004/2005 Russia imported agricultural products with an average 
annual value of USD14.5 billion, while the value of agricultural exports was less than a 
fourth of the value of imports: USD3.2 billion (UNSD HS data). Figure 4.1 shows that the 
financial crisis in 1998 had a major impact on agricultural imports: between 1997 and 
2000 the value of imports decreased from USD12.7 billion to USD7.0 billion, following 
the devaluation of the ruble. At the same time the Russian agricultural sector could not 
really benefit from the improved terms of trade (as Russian export products became less 
expensive in dollar-terms due to the devaluation of the ruble), and exports slightly 
decreased. A partial explanation lies in the fact that the government levied export taxes to 
secure domestic food supply after imports decreased. Since 2000, both agricultural exports 
and imports are growing steady, but imports are growing faster, thereby increasing the 
agricultural trade deficit, which was USD12.4 billion in 2005. 
 Russian agricultural exports are concentrated on a few product groups. In 2004/2005, 
cereals accounted for about a third of total agricultural exports, with wheat (26%) and 
barley (5%) as the most important export products. Another important product group was 
fish (12%), mainly frozen whole fish. Sunflower and rape seeds are important export 
products for Russia in its trade with the EU. Germany imports large quantities of oilseeds 
for bio-fuel production. 
 
                                                 
1 In this paragraph agricultural trade does not include wood. Total wood exports from Russia amounted 
USD4.9 billion in 2005. 
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Figure 4.1 Russian agricultural trade, 1996-2005, total agricultural trade (excl. wood), excl. trade with 
Belarus  
Source: UNSD HS data. 
 
 
 Russian agricultural imports are more diversified. In 2004/2005, imports of meat 
accounted for 18%, with an average annual combined value of USD2.6 billion. Beef, 
poultry and pork all account for some 5 to 6% of total agricultural imports. Next to meat 
Russia imported mainly fruits and nuts (13%), beverages and spirits (9%), dairy products, 
fish, sugars and molasses and tobacco (UNSD HS data).  
 
 
Table 4.2 Russia's main agricultural export and import partners (2005) 
Exports from Russia Value (million 
USD) 
Share 
(%) 
 Imports by Russia  Value 
(million USD) 
Share 
(%) 
Kazakhstan  525  13  Brazil  2,116  13 
Ukraine  446  11  Ukraine  1,412   9 
Egypt  344  9  Germany  903  6 
Azerbaijan  215  5  United States  881  5 
Georgia  180  5  Netherlands  641  4 
China  150  4  China  598  4 
Source: UNSD HS data. 
 
 
 The ten largest importers of Russian agricultural products in 2005 were Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Georgia, China, Italy, Japan and Saudi Arabia 
(see also table 4.2). Belarus is not included in UNSD HS statistics on Russian agricultural 
trade, but Belarusian imports from Russia amounted USD633 million in 2005. The 
Netherlands was only a small importer of Russian agricultural products in 2005, with 
imports worth USD22 million. 
 Russia's main suppliers of agricultural products in 2005 were Brazil, Ukraine, 
Belarus (not included in table 4.2, but agricultural exports amounted over USD1.1 billion), 
Germany, USA, the Netherlands, China, Argentina, Poland and France. With an average 
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export value of USD574 million in 2004/2005, the Netherlands is a relative large supplier 
of agricultural products for Russia. Since 1999 Russian imports from the Netherlands have 
increased sharply (see figure 4.2). 
 
4.2.3 Agricultural trade between Russia and the Netherlands 
 
Dutch agricultural imports from Russia in 2006 amounted EUR87 million, while the 
export of agricultural products to Russia was EUR1.085 billion.1 With an agricultural trade 
balance of EUR998 million the Netherlands is one of the largest (net) exporters of 
agricultural products on the Russian market (Kelholt, 2007). Between 2005 and 2006 
Dutch agricultural exports showed a sharp increase (growth of 37%), and preliminary 
figures show that the Netherlands has reached a ten-year record. Figure 4.2 shows the 
development of Dutch agricultural trade with Russia in the period 1997-2006.  
 In 2006, the Netherlands mainly imported (rough) wood (73% of total imports), 
frozen fish, vegetable oils, oilseeds (sunflower seeds), dairy (mainly caseïne) and cocoa 
products. Dutch exports to Russia are more diversified and comprise a large range of 
product categories. The main product categories are ornaments (cut flowers and plants - 
21%), fruits and nuts (e.g. apples and pears), vegetables (e.g. tomatoes and sweet peppers), 
animal feed (exclusive grains), meat (mainly pork and poultry), dairy (mainly cheese) and 
coffee and cocoa products (Kelholt, 2007, see figure 4.3). A comparison of exports of 
2005 and 2006 shows a high increase of the exports of ornaments and plants (70%), a 80% 
increase of the exports of fruit and nuts as well as vegetables, a 33% increase of meat 
exports and a modest increase of animal feed exports. Total growth over this period of 
agricultural exports from the Netherlands to Russia was 40% (Kelholt, 2007). 
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Figure 4.2 Dutch agricultural trade with Russia, 1997-2006 
Source: Kelholt (2006; 2007). 
                                                 
1 An estimated 30 million euro related to Dutch export of 16,000 live cattle to Russia has not been included 
yet in these preliminary data. 
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Figure 4.3 Dutch agricultural exports to Russia, main categories  
Source: Kelholt (2007). 
 
 
 Next to the agricultural products mentioned above, the Dutch agribusiness sector 
also supplies additional goods and services, which are not showed in agricultural trade 
statistics, but covered under other headings. These are e.g. veterinary products, plant 
protection products (pesticides), fertilisers, agricultural machinery, barn equipment, stable 
equipment, cooling installations, sorting and packaging machinery and storage facilities. 
 
 
Russian statistics on agricultural production, trade and foreign investment are to be examined critically. 
Sometimes large dissimilarities occur when Russian statistics are compared with statistics from EU, IMF, 
UNCTAD and other international organisations. This box tries to identify some explanations for these 
dissimilarities. 
 
Agricultural statistics 
Serova (2006) argues that Russia and other transition economies face problems with agricultural statistics 
because the applied statistical models were designed for central planned economies in the Soviet period. 
These models have difficulties dealing with the evolving market economy and therefore fail to provide 
reliable information. This in turn hampers good agricultural policy formulation based on reliable statistics 
(which is common in developed countries). Serova also explains at least part of the large decrease of 
agricultural production in the early 1990s (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) by the nature of Russian 
agricultural statistics. In the Soviet period regional authorities were rewarded for overproduction within their 
territories and this caused global over-reporting of agricultural production at all government levels. On the 
other hand, the market reforms and new tax measures in the early 1990s were an incentive for underreporting 
to avoid high taxation. This contrast caused agricultural production statistics to drop more than was the case 
in practice. 
 
Trade 
A comparison of statistics from Eurostat (COMEXT) and the Customs Committee of Russia on agri-food 
trade between Russia and the Netherlands presents remarkable results (Karlova, 2006). In general, Russian 
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customs statistics on import and export values are far lower than mirror Dutch/Eurostat figures. For example, 
according to Eurostat the Netherlands exported agricultural and food products to Russia worth EUR838 
million in 2005. The Customs Committee of Russia registered only Russian imports from the Netherlands 
worth EUR526 million. One would expect a difference between the export and import value, as both are 
calculated differently: import values are including costs of freight and insurances, which are not in export 
values. Yet, this implies that import values would be higher than export values, while the comparison of 
Dutch/EU with Russian statistics indicates it is the other way around! Also, the export value of Russia to 
Netherlands (registered by the Russian Customs Committee) was 30% less than import value of the 
Netherlands (registered by Eurostat). Looking at the trade statistics in physical terms, the picture is the other 
way around! Dutch export volumes are (in quite a number of cases) higher than the Russian import volumes, 
while Russian export volumes are registered higher than the (opposite) Dutch import volume. Causes or 
reasons for the sometimes huge discrepancy between Russian and Dutch trade data are difficult to identify, 
but could for instance be found in differences in converting rubles to dollars and/or euros and/or different 
classification of products (trade codes or country or origin) aimed at avoiding import duties, export taxes or 
other (e.g. SPS) restrictions.  
 
Investment  
Figures on foreign investment in Russia are available since 1998, while figures on investment in specific 
sectors (and by country) are only available since 2003. This makes it difficult to compare the investment 
positions of third countries. Furthermore, Russian investment figures are sometimes difficult to read, which 
is partly caused by the difference in reporting of direct investments. Rosstat reports direct investments to 
Russia as gross amounts, while the Central Bank gives the net amounts of investment flows, i.e. the 
investments placed abroad have been deducted from these (Virolainen, 2006: 12). Furthermore it is often 
unclear whether total foreign investment or foreign direct investment is meant. Foreign investment can be 
divided into two broad categories: foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is defined as a long-term investment by a foreign direct investor in an enterprise resident in 
an economy other than that in which the foreign direct investor is based. The primary type of FDI occurs 
when existing assets are transferred from local firms to foreign firms (merger or acquisition). FDI can also 
take the form of greenfield investment (direct investment in new facilities or the expansion of existing 
facilities). Portfolio investment represents passive holdings of securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, or 
other financial assets, none of which entails active management or control of the securities' issuer by the 
investor; where such control exists, it is known as foreign direct investment. Credits are often assigned to a 
separate rest category of foreign investment, but they constituted 58% of total foreign investment in Russia 
in 2005. FDI (mostly contributions in capital) had a share of 24%  
(http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2006/rus06e/23-09.htm).  
Box 4.1 Russian statistics; some remarks 
 
 
4.2.4 Agricultural trade policy 
 
Russian agricultural trade policy is increasingly focused on import substitution. Currently 
Russia is still a major net importer of agricultural products, but the country strives for self-
sufficiency in a number of products.  
 After the crisis of 1998 Russian agriculture experienced a recovery growth, because 
imports were too expensive. But when imports gradually restored, the Russian government 
started to facilitate the recovery process through various border measures. However, this 
growth in protectionism was limited by WTO negotiations. On average however, import 
duties in the agro-food sector in Russia were 13.5% in 2004. In the meat sector there are 
tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for beef and pork (since 2003) and poultry (since 2006). But 
these TRQs did not hold back meat imports which started to increase since 2005. Domestic 
meat production was not much affected by the import restrictions. In the national 
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agricultural project stable TRQs were set for meat imports and import duties for livestock 
imports for 2006-2009. The sugar regime was changed in 2003: for raw sugar there is a 
variable import levy (support price minus basis price and world price) and for white sugar 
there is a specific duty (USD360/tonne). The change of the regime boosted domestic sugar 
production. For wheat and rye export duties of EUR25/tonne were applied in 2004 to slow 
down bread prices. However, high bread prices were not caused by cereal deficits and thus 
the export limitation could not stop bread prices inflation. Import duties on animal feed 
(soy, some maize varieties and fish flour) were abolished in 2005 in order to provide 
cheaper feed for the domestic livestock breeding.  
 Next to tariffs and quotas, Russia employs a whole range of non-tariff trade barriers, 
which are often changing. Companies exporting to Russia are facing changing procedures 
for product registration, import licenses, veterinary inspections and phytosanitary 
inspections. Mostly these problems are confined to certain countries (e.g. Dutch flowers, 
Polish meat and dairy products or Georgian and Moldovan wine), but in December 2006 
Russia threatened to ban all EU livestock imports as from January 2007 because of alleged 
concerns over the quality of livestock entering the EU market from the new Member 
States, Bulgaria and Romania. Although the EU has convinced Russia that all EU food 
exports is safe, the livestock case shows the power of the Russian Federal Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Inspection Service (Rosselkhoznadzor) should not be underestimated (Agra 
Europe, 2006b). Recent comments by Russian Minister of Agriculture Gordeev to the 
effect that Russia's recent controversial ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wine 
had been helpful for the re-establishment of the Russian wine industry reinforced 
suspicions that Russia's import bans on ground of animal, plant or consumer health only 
serve an economic agenda.  
 
Regional trade agreements 
Russia is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)1, the group of 
former Soviet Republics. Together with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan Russia founded the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2000 
(Uzbekistan joined in 2006). The community strives for synchronisation of import 
regulations and tariffs, but it is not likely that a common agricultural market (CAM) of all 
or some CIS countries will emerge in the near future. On the contrary, Russia 
progressively restricts imports from these countries (Serova et al., 2006a). Russia has only 
far-reaching cooperation agreements with Belarus (several union treaties) and Serbia 
(preferential trade agreement).  
 
                                                 
1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan  
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The main bilateral agreement between Russia and the EU is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA), which was signed in 1994 and entered into force on 1 December 1997. One of the main objectives of 
the PCA is the promotion of trade and investment as well as the development of harmonious economic 
relations between the two partners. As regards economic relations, the PCA includes provisions on Most-
favored Nations treatment, freedom of establishment of EU and Russian companies, approximation of 
legislation, intellectual property rights and trade defence instruments. In June 1999 the EU adopted the 
Common Strategy on Russia. In 2001 the process of economic cooperation was continued with the launch of 
the Common European Economic Space (CEES). The long-term objective of the CEES is the elimination of 
trade barriers between the EU and Russia mostly through regulatory convergence. The economic integration 
of Russia into Europe experienced a new milestone with the accession of the eight Central and Eastern 
European countries to the EU in 2004. Overall, the accession has had positive effects for Russia, since the 
terms of trade have improved for Russia and exports to these countries has become more profitable. 
In 2005 the EU and Russia agreed on detailed frameworks for intensifying cooperation in four 'spaces', 
including the Common Economic Space. Currently negotiations are going on concerning a bilateral 
agreement on trade and investment between Russia and the EU. 
 The Netherlands only has a treaty with Russia on the avoidance of double taxation (1998) and an 
Investment Protection Agreement (1991).  
Box 4.2 Trade agreements between Russia and the EU/the Netherlands 
 
 
4.2.5 WTO accession 
 
Membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) can play a major role in 
strengthening Russia's position in the world economy. Not only Russia will benefit from 
accession, EU businesses willing to export to or invest in Russia also profit from Russian 
WTO accession. Accession will not only require concessions on tariffs and the use of trade 
instruments, but it will also require 'behind-the-border' reforms, such as liberalisation of 
services, reform of FDI policies, protection of intellectual property rights, modernisation 
of customs, transport and trade facilitation, enhanced domestic competition, improved 
product standards, rules for public procurement and legal and juridical reforms. Yet, this 
accession remains a difficult issue, due to different bilateral conflicts between Russia and 
other countries. Russia has to conclude bilateral agreements on market access with 58 
WTO members before the multilateral accession process can be completed. Russia applied 
to the WTO already in 1993 and by the end of 2006 the accession procedure at last seems 
to have reached the final stage. 
 In May 2004 Russia has signed a bilateral agreement with the EU, after more than 
two years of negotiation. At the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 
2005 as well as in January 2006 Russia signed a number of bilateral agreements with, 
among others, Brazil and Switzerland. The most complex accession negotiations were 
done with the USA, which were concluded in November 2006. One of the main obstacles 
in the Russia-US bilateral negotiations was related to veterinary and phytosanitary 
standards, with Russia expressing its concern over existing US food safety and animal 
health standards, the latter especially with respect to beef and pork production (Agra 
Europe, 2006a).. The market access system for meat in Russia is also an issue of high 
political concern in the EU, since Russia has imposed a ban on Polish meat exports, also 
for food safety reasons. The European Commission stated that Russia was faking food 
safety concerns for political reasons (FoodQualitynews.com, 26 May 2006).  
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 By the end of 2006, Russia still had to conclude accession agreements with Costa 
Rica, Georgia and Moldova. Negotiations with the latter two may be difficult as, Russia's 
relationship with the Georgia and Moldova is troubled. Next to the Russian embargo on 
imports of fruits and wine from these countries, there is a more important issue, which is 
the status of the separatist territories, Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in Georgia. Although Russia and Georgia signed a bilateral accession deal in 2004, 
Georgia withdrew its signature in July 2006, because of the diplomatic row on the status of 
the two territories (Bridges Weekly 10: 39). 
 After all bilateral protocols are signed, negotiations on the multilateral agreements, 
including the one on agriculture, have to be concluded. These negotiations will not be 
easy, because Russia increasingly shows a disinterest in market reform (Ǻslund, 2006). In 
his first period as president (2000-2003), Putin and his Minister of Economic Development 
and Trade, Gref, embraced market reform and entry to the WTO. But soon resistance 
against Russia's accession also rose. Minister of Agriculture Gordeev was one of the 
representatives of the protectionist lobby. Agriculture is still perceived as one of the least 
competitive sectors that probably will lose from trade liberalisation. In his second period 
(as from 2004), Putin consolidated authoritarian power and lost interest in pro-market 
reforms. While the Minister of Economic Development and Trade remained pro-WTO, 
Putin opted for going slow on WTO accession. The oil boom contributed much to this shift 
in policy. After all, Russia does not suffer much from export barriers because each country 
wants to buy oil and gas and therefore Russia's perceived need of the WTO has declined. 
Furthermore membership will involve costly changes in policies and industrial structures. 
At the same time Putin overruled Minister of Agriculture Gordeev, when he allowed 
reasonable rules for access to the Russian market for US chicken, pork and beef. This 
shows the unpredictability of the Russian government (Ǻslund, 2006).  
 According to OECD (2006b) a major issue in the agricultural negotiations is the 
definition of the reference period of domestic support for further reductions, and also the 
amount of this assistance as measured by the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS). 
So far, it has been agreed that Russia may use 1993-95 as reference period, but several 
other negotiating parties consider this period as too distant. Furthermore, the Russian AMS 
should be reduced from USD16.2 billion to USD9 billion, but this amount is still 
considered too high by some parties. Russia argues that the current situation does not 
reflect agricultural conditions adequately and would rather like to take the late 1980s as 
reference period. Although current subsidies are very low, the Russian agricultural lobby 
wants to keep the option open for larger subsidies in the future (Ǻslund, 2006). Another 
discussion point in the negotiations is the inclusion of export subsidies in Russia's 
proposal. Several negotiating parties point to the fact that as export subsidies will probably 
be abolished in 2013, Russia should not bring this into the discussion. Russian meat 
quotas, which were also point of discussion in the negotiations with the US, will continue 
to play a role in the multilateral negotiations. 
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4.3 Foreign investment in the Russian Federation 
 
4.3.1 Total foreign investment 
 
Foreign investment in Russia is rapidly increasing at an almost exponential pace since 
1999. Figures from Rosstat estimate total foreign investment in 2005 at USD54 billion, 
which is a 32% increase from USD41 billion in 2004. Preliminary figures suggest that 
2006 will again show an increase compared to the previous year. The Russian investment 
figures compare favorably to foreign investment growth in the other three BRIC-countries 
Brazil, India and China, which experienced a modest growth or even a decline in foreign 
investment between 2004 and 2005. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia amounted 
USD13.1 billion in 2005 (24% of total foreign investment), up from USD9.4 billion in 
2004 (Rosstat). CBR1 figures estimated FDI in 2005 at USD16.7 billion. Most investments 
were made in the wholesale trade (37%), manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
(15%) and mining and quarrying (11%).2 According to FIAC (2006), Russia ranked fourth 
in total FDI among all emerging markets in 2005, after China, Hong Kong and Mexico. 
 With regard to outward FDI Russia has entered the top 3 of developing and 
transition economies in terms of stocks (accumulated FDI). In 2005 Russia's stock of 
outward FDI was calculated at USD120 billion, far more than accumulated FDI in Russia, 
which amounted USD50 billion. Especially Russian transnational corporations in the oil 
and gas sector (Gazprom, Lukoil) are very active on the world market. The Netherlands 
was the main destination of Russian foreign direct investment (EVD, 2006). 
 Figure 4.4 shows the main sources of foreign investment in Russia in 2004 and 2005, 
as well as the main sources of accumulated investments in June 2006. Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and Great-Britain were the most important sources of foreign investment in 
2005. It should be noted however that investments coming from Luxemburg, Cyprus, the 
Virgin Islands and Switzerland are mostly originated from Russian companies from these 
countries.3 Dutch (and British) investments in Russia are largely accounted for by Royal 
Shell, which has a large project on liquid natural gas (LNG) in the Far Eastern District on 
the island of Sakhalin. 
 Investments from Shell and Heineken have strongly improved the Dutch foreign 
investment position in Russia. In 2000 the share of the Netherlands in total foreign 
investment was 11%, but it decreased to 6% in 2002 and 2003. However, in 2004 and 2005 
investment was on the rise again and in 2005 the Netherlands had a share of 17%. 
Investment figures on the period January-September 2006 show that Great-Britain has 
become the largest foreign investor (16%), followed by the Netherlands (15%), while 
Luxemburg's share has been increasing sharply.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation. 
2 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2006/rus06e/23-10.htm. 
3 In 1998 a massive flight of capital took place due to the ruble crisis. Russian companies store their capital 
at banks in countries like Luxemburg and Cyprus. The figures show that this flight has stopped: Russian 
companies are 'repatriating' their capital. 
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Figure 4.4 Foreign investments in Russia, 2004, 2005 and accumulated June 2006 
Source: IET, 2006. 
 
 
4.3.2 Foreign investment in the Russian food and agriculture sector 
 
In the mid-1990s, FDI in the Russian food and agriculture sector started gaining substance. 
In 1995, there were two large investment projects (the Mars factory in Stupino and the 
Coca-Cola Plant in Stavropol) with a total value of USD150 million. Between 1998 and 
2000 total foreign investment (FDI and other investment) in food and agriculture increased 
from USD1.5 to USD1.8 billion, and in 2000 the sector had a share of 17% in foreign 
investment.  
 But the share has decreased sharply between 2000 and 2004, both in relative and 
absolute terms. In 2004 investments only amounted USD1.1 billion, or 3% of total foreign 
investment. Although the year 2005 showed a rise in absolute terms towards USD1.4 
billion, the share remains at 3% (see figure 4.5). Most foreign capital (about 90% in recent 
years) goes to the food industry, while a minor share goes to the primary sector. At the 
same time it is widely believed that the Russian food (and agriculture) sector has plenty of 
growth potential. The volume of investments is still very low compared to other CIS 
countries. A main reason for this is the lack of interest on the side of the Russian 
government to promote Russia as an investment destination (FIAC, 2006). 
 Ylä-Kojola (2006: 98) shows that the food sector share of FDI inflow in Russia (3%) 
is lower than in some other Central and Eastern European countries. In 2004 the shares in 
Ukraine, Poland and Hungary were well above 7%, while foreign investments in the Polish 
food sector were even higher in absolute terms. The same picture is shown in figure 4.6, 
where Dutch FDI in the food, beverages and tobacco sectors in Russia, Poland, Hungary 
and total Eastern Europe is compared over the period 1999-2005. The figure shows that 
only since 2005 Russia is the number one destination of Dutch FDI in the food sector in 
East Europe (with almost 30% of total FDI). Furthermore, FDI in all three countries 
increases rapidly in 2003, which corresponds with figures from Rosstat. Rosstat has 
country-specific data on foreign investment in food and agriculture since 2003: in that year 
 46 
total Dutch investment in the Russian food and agriculture sector was USD235 million, in 
2004 USD119 million and in 2005 USD191 million. These figures are far lower than in 
figure 4.6 (De Nederlandsche Bank). 
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Figure 4.5 Foreign investment in Russian food and agriculture, 1998-2005  
Source: Rosstat. 
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Eastern Europe  
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4.3.3 Doing business in Russia: the investment and business climate 
 
Through a survey of 155 foreign investors the Foreign Investment Advisory Council 
(FIAC) has investigated why some international companies are investing in Russia, while 
others are not. The survey concludes that Russia is becoming more competitive with other 
markets, such as China, India and Brazil, although interviewees consider Russia's 
investment climate and opportunities still behind the other BRIC-countries. Most current 
investors in Russia experience significant year-on-year growth and are planning to increase 
their business operations and investments in next three years. At the same time the 
investors say that the Russian investment climate could be improved by dealing with a 
number of problems 'on the ground' faced by both domestic and foreign investors. 
However, the investors in the FIAC survey rate Russia's investment risk lower than in 
2005.  
 Major obstacles for investment in Russia are administrative barriers (mentioned by 
84% of the investors), corruption (78%), inadequate and inconsistent legislation (71%) and 
selective interpretation and application of the law (67%). The most common problem that 
international firms face on a daily basis is excessive regulations for visas, work permits 
and other business operations. A major theme in the FIAC survey is the lack of clarity and 
consistency in Russian government policy. 'Investors want clear policies on which 
economic and industrial sectors foreign investors are most welcome, and they want 
consistent application and enforcement of laws and regulations. Providing clarity and 
consistency on these issues could unleash significant more foreign investment in Russia 
(FIAC, 2006). The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) mentioned some very 
concrete measures as necessary conditions for enhancing economic cooperation with 
Russia, such as the enforcement of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights 
and a consistent application of international accounting and auditing standards (Burgmans 
and Sutherland, 2006). 
 The World Bank (2006c) assesses the business climate in a large group of countries 
including most transition economies, covering ten components on business regulations and 
their enforcement across 155 countries. The ten components are as follows: starting a 
business, dealing with licenses, hiring and firing workers, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and 
closing a business. These components are measured separately, using various indicators. 
The report provides at the end a composite index, called the 'Ease of doing business 
ranking', ranking countries reviewed from 1 to 155. The World Bank recognizes that the 
ranking is limited in scope. For instance, it does not account for a country's proximity to 
large markets, quality of infrastructure, macroeconomic conditions or the strength of 
underlying institutions. Yet, it does give useful indications of a country's business climate. 
Over the last years Russia's ranking improved slightly but her rank (96th) is still relatively 
modest, just between two neighboring large countries Kazakhstan (63th) and Ukraine 
(126th).  
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Some more details on Russia's score on some of the major components assessing the business climate in the 
country are the following. It is rather easy to start a business in Russia: only 8 procedures are involved. Cost 
is 5% of per capita income (USD171). Minimum capital is 4.4% of per year income, or USD150. However, 
dealing with licenses in Russia comprises 22 procedures involving cost equivalent of 354% of per capita 
income, which is USD12,061. It takes 528 days to settle the license issues. Firing workers in Russia is not 
expensive, costing only salary of 17 weeks. Registering property has 6 procedures with cost only 0.4% of 
property value. In the depth of credit information index Russia scores zero points, which indicates that there 
is no official channel to deal with creditworthiness of potential business partners. In the early years of the 
21st century Russia clarified rules in paying taxes. There are presently only 27 payment categories involved. 
Total tax payable is 40.8% of gross profit.  
Box 4.3 Details from the World Bank 'Doing Business in 2006' report 
 
 
 One of the best-known qualitative indices measuring business climate is called the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published annually by non-profit organisation 
Transparency International (Tiusanen, 2006). This index is compiled by interviewing 
several thousands of people involved in international business. The respondents are asked 
to assess corruption in almost 150 countries. The CPI has been published annually for 
more than ten years now. Scores and ranks of countries involved do not fluctuate strongly 
from year to year. Russia is at the lower end of the table on place 126, with a score of 2.4 
(on the scale between 0 [entirely dishonest] and 10 [an entirely honest country]).1 It is 
often maintained that paying bribes means paying unofficial taxes on top of the official 
ones. Therefore, high corruption level is an impediment in attracting FDI. Russian is at the 
bottom of the scale in both FDI per capita statistics as well as in the CPI table. 
                                                 
1 For comparison: Ukraine scores 2.6, ranked 107th. 
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5. Main drivers of the Russian agri-food sector 
 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the major issues in the development of Russia's 
primary agriculture and processing industry and to indicate the impact of expected 
developments on the agribusiness sector. 
 
 
5.1 Overall economic development 
 
Overall economic growth in Russia has been impressive in the years since the crisis in 
1998, with an average annual growth rate of 8.1% over the period 1999-2003 
(OECD/FAO, 2005). Also in 2004 and 2005, economic developments have been quite 
favorable resulting in GDP increases of 7.2% and 6.4% respectively (IMF, 2006). Yet, 
while the forecasts for the short-term still indicate a further continuation of robust growth - 
IMF projects 6.5% GDP growth in 2006 and 2007 (IMF, 2006) - projections for the 
medium-term projections are much more prudent. In its Agricultural Outlook until 2015, 
OECD/FAO (2006) expects that economic performance will slow markedly between 2006 
and 2009 from 5.5% to 3.3%, with growth in Russia averaging 2.7% per year from 2010 
onwards. This annual growth level is higher than in the EU15 (2%), yet much lower than 
in other emerging countries like China (6.5%), India (5.4%) or Turkey (7.3%) in the same 
period. Although the numbers differ slightly from what OECD/FAO projections, FAPRI's 
Outlook (2006) shows a similar tendency for Russia's GDP estimates until 2015. 
 At the same time, inflation remains a serious concern in Russia. OECD projects 
inflation rates higher than in West-Europe and the USA. The exchange rate of the Ruble, 
consequently, is expected to depreciate against the USD by approximately one quarter over 
the course of the outlook period (2006-2015).  
 Uncertainties in the macro-economic development in Russia are largely related to the 
price development of natural resources. Revenues from oil and natural gas exploitation are 
extremely important to the Russia economy: the high crude oil prices in 2006 contributed 
much to the trade balance surplus and the favorable financial situation of the government 
budget. However, crude oil prices are volatile, subject to economic and political factors, 
and thus difficult to project. Baseline projections by OECD/FAO (2006) assume that crude 
oil prices decline from their 2006 high levels to reach a level just under USD40/barrel. 
Significant lower oil prices may decrease government revenues and trade surpluses, 
slowing down economic growth of the country. This may lower the expectations of 
increasing demand of food in Russia. Yet, lower energy prices also reduce agricultural 
production costs. Energy is used directly for machinery operation, and indirectly through 
other inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides the production of which is particularly energy 
demanding. In consequence, lower energy prices reduce production costs, which may 
induce increase of agricultural supply, leading to lower prices both regionally and 
internationally. Lower prices for agricultural and food products, thus, may counterbalance 
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a decline in demand of food due to lower income (growth). Furthermore, Russia is 
prepared to absorb a sudden decline in crude oil and gas prices through the establishment 
of its Stabilisation Fund (see chapter 4). This Fund can be used to stimulate economic 
growth in times growth falls short, among others when prices for its natural resources 
decline. 
 The OECD recognizes the efficient and prudent management of commodity 
windfalls Russia's principal macroeconomic policy challenge (OECD, 2006, Economic 
Survey). An uncontrolled surge of windfall revenues in the economy would drive up 
inflation and undermine competitiveness (through rapid exchange rate appreciation). Next, 
OECD points at the inefficiency and corruption of the state administration that impose a 
heavy burden on business, and recommends improvements in the institutional environment 
within which the bureaucracy operates by strengthening the rule of law, increase 
transparency in the policy making process, and to reduce state control and bureaucratic 
interferences in business. Russia's transition into a period of self-sustaining, investment 
and innovation-led growth would very much depend on a successful implementation of 
government's efforts to administrative reforms. 
 
 
5.2 Consumer and chain developments 
 
Due to increasing welfare and spending power among local consumers, especially in the 
cities of Russia, attitudes towards food shopping are changing rapidly (Euromonitor, 
2006). Consumers have become much more discerning, choosing for better quality, more 
variety and for convenience products. Consequently, consumer preferences will also 
change in the years to come, as general wealth is expected to increase further in Russia. 
This implies a further shifting from a traditional consumption basket with bread, soup and 
cabbage towards a much more diversified basket (Euromonitor, 2006). Meat and fish 
consumption is expected to increase, substituting bread. Consumer trends indicate that 
there is an increasing preference for fresh meat and fish products. Due to the local cuisine 
potatoes probably will remain one of the largest groups of vegetables consumed as a 
garnish or a main meal. Russian consumers are expected to diversify their demand for 
vegetables, away from the traditional types. Yet, seasonable supply in fruit and vegetables 
hampers locally produced sales. This implies that as consumers demand more variety 
imports in these categories of products are expected to grow. 
 Supermarkets/hypermarkets are expected to take over sales from the traditional 
distribution channels. This process, already taken place in many of the larger cities in 
Russia in the last 4-5 years, spreads into the country regions, reaching smaller cities.  
 Further consolidation in retail and wholesale trade is expected, steadily changing the 
structure of the food retail sector in Russia which is presently still far away from modern 
structures achieved in the rich part of the world. In 2005, old-fashioned grocery stores (not 
involved in retail chains) occupied a dominant market share of some 40%. Open-air food 
markets (remnants of Soviet era 'kolkhoz-markets') sold about one fifth of foodstuffs, 
while modern format retail chains have an estimated market share of less than one quarter 
(Tiusanen and Malinen, 2006:23). This indicates that the Russian (food) retail sector is still 
fragmented, and, therefore, offers plenty of options in mergers and acquisitions. In 
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analyzing the developments in the retail sector in Russia, Tousanen and Malinen (2006) 
point at the extreme dynamism in the last 5 years. During this period several foreign food 
retailing firms have launched operations in the country, and many of them are planning 
further expansion. Consolidation of Russian retailing is therefore likely to have much 
Western involvement in the next 10-year period.  
 As in many Western economies, food consumption expenditures through eating 
outdoors will increase in (especially urban) Russia. Hotel, restaurants and catering sectors 
are becoming more and more diverse. Fast food restaurants are developing at a fast rate in 
Russia (Euromonitor, 2006). 
 
 
5.3 Technological development 
 
In terms of technology, the Russian agricultural sector has a dual character, with farms 
operating traditionally with many labor employed and little capital used, while others 
produce with up to date technology in equipment and machinery, applying knowledge-
intensive production methods. The latter are the vertically integrated agro-holdings type of 
farms, and other, mainly larger-sized farms (see also chapter 3 for the various forms of 
agricultural farms). Investments in technology improvements on these farms are mainly 
from private investors and/or 'mother companies' outside primary agriculture. Generally 
speaking, however, the Russian agricultural sector is characterised by low levels of 
investments. Productivity levels are therefore rather low. 
 Improved (land and labor) productivity can be achieved by the developments in new 
and/or the application of existing but more up-to-date technological knowledge. The 
process of technical development has three important aspects: the development of 
knowledge, the dissemination of that knowledge and its application. The development of 
new technology takes place in universities, research institutes and within the industry. 
Public investments in the development and application of technology improvements and 
innovations in general, and in the agricultural sector in particular, have not been very 
successful in Russia in the last decade and a half (see OECD, 2006a). With the start of the 
National priority project in agriculture and especially the input programs in this project, 
upgrading of the sector in technology terms may be enhanced. The National project mainly 
consists of subprojects with credit subsidy measures for investments at livestock and 
smallholder farms. As the National Project in agriculture has only been launched in early 
2006 it is too early to evaluate how successful it can be in achieving its main objectives.1 
 Yet, next to investments in primary production, investments in other parts of the 
chain are equally important to increase competitiveness of the Russian agribusiness sector. 
This would require investments in storage and other post-harvest handling of agricultural 
commodities, investments in more efficient transport and product distribution systems, and 
investments in the processing stage of agricultural commodities. In order to tempt farmers 
                                                 
1 Critics point at the key position of two state corporations - Rosselkhozbank and Rosagroleasing - in the 
implementation of the national project on agriculture. These institutes receive significant financial support 
and privileges on the lending and leasing markets, which will enforce their monopoly power (Serova et al., 
2006a). Also the OECD points at the necessary institutional conditions and arrangements for effective public 
intervention in the innovation process (OECD, 2006a).  
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and agricultural companies to investments, they will need sustained macroeconomic 
stability and strong framework conditions for business, policies that will not only facilitate 
innovation but enhance overall economic performance.  
 A major opportunity to facilitate modernisation and restructuring of the agri-food 
chain is via foreign direct investment (FDI) or licensing of technology. It is well known 
that the importance of FDI stems not only from the sums invested but from as foreign 
companies bring in technological and management knowledge that results in increasing 
productivity in itself, these investment generate positive spillovers for the domestic firms 
and farms. At present the inflow of FDI in Russia is rather low, especially in the 
agricultural and food industry. Abolishing restrictions to foreign investment would help to 
make Russia more attractive to foreign investors, yet FDI inflow not only depends on FDI 
liberalisation. The OECD points at the fact that Russia, if it is to benefit to a greater extent 
from foreign investments, structural reforms on several policy areas such as financial 
sector reform, strengthening intellectual property rights and reductions in regional 
bureaucracy are necessary (OECD, 2006a: 12). 
 
 
5.4 Russian agricultural and rural policy 
 
Since the beginning of 1990s, the Russian government has made efforts to reform the 
agricultural sector. The de-collectivisation of the former state and collective farms has 
been an important measure in this respect. On average agricultural support in the Russian 
Federation has decreased dramatically. Lack of financial resources caused the Russian 
government to focus on protection and limited direct support. In the first half of the 1990s 
direct subsidies and periodic debt write-offs were the main policy instruments, but they did 
not contribute much to the necessary restructuring process in the agricultural sector.  
 A shift was then made towards a government policy of credit interest rate 
subsidizing, among others through the state-owned bank Rosselkhozbank, whereby the 
federal budget compensates two-thirds of the interest paid by the debtor (Serova et al., 
2006a). The scheme first only provided short-term loans, but in 2005 a system for long-
term credits (5-8 years) was introduced. Another policy measure was the unification of 
agricultural taxes, which was especially helpful for smaller farms. The introduction of 
leasing programs, which gave cash-strapped farms access to new agricultural machinery 
and cattle, was not very successful; the equipment producers and state-owned 
Rosagroleasing were the largest beneficiaries. The main problem in Russian agriculture 
today is still caused by the large group of ineffective and inefficient farms, mostly former 
state and collective farms. These farms receive most support, but their productivity is very 
low compared to the efficient market-oriented farms that emerged in recent years. 
Therefore 'support for them is largely a matter of social policy' (OECD, 2006a). 
 In recent years input subsidies constitute the majority of domestic support. The 
already mentioned interest rate subsidies are important in this respect, but also various 
payments for inputs such as fertilizer, high quality seeds and insemination material. Output 
subsidies (price support) are mostly paid to livestock products, with about 78% of the total 
going to milk (OECD, 2006b). This shows that the focus is clearly on the dairy/livestock 
sector, as became clear in September 2005, when President Putin designated agriculture as 
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one of four priorities for national development, next to housing, health care and education 
(Serova et al., 2006a). The national priority project for the agricultural and food sector is 
referred to as 'National Priority Project for Development of Agro-Industrial Complex' and 
is worth USD1.1 billion (2006-2007). It is implemented in addition to the regular 
agricultural policy; some measure overlap (e.g. credit subsidies) and some measures are 
new. The three main aims of the project are: 
- accelerated livestock sector development (increase of milk and meat production); 
- stimulation of smallholder farmers (leasing livestock, loans); 
- provision of rural housing for young specialists working in rural areas and 
particularly for those engaged in agriculture. 
 
 The last aim of the priority project refers to the importance of rural development next 
to agricultural development. For this purpose there is a separate programme, the Federal 
rural development programme for 2002-2010. This programme co-finances from the 
federal budget rural development efforts at regional level. This involves the construction of 
houses, schools, hospitals and polyclinic construction, electric power lines, gas systems 
and water pipes, as well as telecommunication services and roads (Serova et al., 2006a). 
However, it seems that the programme does not address the need of alternative non-farm 
jobs in rural areas. 
 Another recent policy change concerns the 'regionalisation' of agricultural support in 
2004, whereby the regional administrations have received main responsibility for 
agricultural support in their regions. This regionalisation might create unfair competition 
between Russia's regions, since rich regions are able to provide higher support to their 
producers than the poorer regions. Furthermore there is a risk of 'aggravation of regional 
protectionism', e.g. bans on movements of agricultural commodities in and outside regions. 
A third risk is the danger of reduced policy transparency, which would complicate policy 
monitoring and effective decision-making.  
 In 2005 the Russian government lowered import duties on industrial equipment 
(including agricultural machinery). The resulting increase in imports will enable Russian 
enterprises to run a technological re-equipping (IET, 2006). Further, foreign manufacturers 
willing to assemble farm equipment in Russia will be required to gradually increase the 
proportion of domestically produced parts from 25% in the first stage to 50% within three 
or four years. These measures are intended to support the domestic agricultural machinery 
market, where investment and technological overhaul is highly needed (OECD, 2006a). 
 In summary, Russia seems to be serious in its attempt to boost the agricultural sector. 
Most likely, agricultural policy at federal level will remain liberal, while some regions 
might implement more protectionist measures (internally). This will not affect Russia's 
position on the world market. Further, it is not clear how successful Russia will be in 
achieving the objectives of the agricultural project and other programs. But, according to 
Serova et al. (2006a) it is already obvious that the federal government is trying to get more 
control via the two state corporations Rosselkhozbank and Rosagroleasing, which receive 
significant financial support and privileges on the lending and leasing markets. This 
hampers emergence of competitive, private banks and leasing companies. 
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5.5 Trade liberalisation/WTO accession 
 
The accession to the WTO is likely to generate substantial overall benefits for Russia. 
WTO membership will increase competition among enterprises and improve transparency 
of Russian trade rules, since Russia will have to bring its legislation in line with rules and 
regulations of the WTO. According to Rutherford and Tarr (2005) welfare gains will be 
equal to 7.3% of GDP in the medium-term and even 11% on the long-term. Major 
assumptions of their model simulation are a significant liberalisation of barriers to foreign 
direct investment and an across the board reduction in tariff barriers by 50%. Domestic 
liberalisation of FDI in the services sector will have the main contribution to the welfare 
gains from WTO accession (72%), while tariff reductions (18%) and improved market 
access for Russian exporters (10%) are the other two contributors. The results strongly 
support the view that Russia's own liberalisation is more important than improvements in 
market access as a result of reforms in tariffs or subsidies in the rest of the world. 
Foremost among the own reforms is liberalisation of barriers against FDI in business 
services. 
 Despite overall gains to the Russian economy, Rutherford and Tarr's projections 
indicate some sectors will contract. Food and agriculture are among the sectors of which 
production will fall as a consequence of WTO accession.1 Consequently, Ruttherfors and 
Tarr project lower exports for both sectors while imports will strongly increase. Serova 
and Karlova (2005), however, assess the possible impact of a WTO agreement on 
agricultural imports as small. The authors point at the fact that a WTO agreement on 
import tariff reduction starts from an agreed upper limit (bound) rate, which then needs to 
be reduced over a number of years. Assuming a reduction commitment of 36% the authors 
claim that the expected level of the bound tariffs at the end of the transition period will be 
higher than the present average (weighted) low level, implying no effective reduction of 
import tariffs for agricultural and food products (although for some specific products it 
may be the case). So, whether WTO accession will lead to more competition from imports, 
depend on the agreed bound rate, the rate of import tariff reduction assumed and the 
present (or actual) tariff rates.  
 According to Simola (2007) Russia would have agreed to reduce the average import 
tariffs on agricultural and food products from 15 to 12%, while some will be fixed at their 
current level. One of the most strictly protected groups is meat products. The current 
minimum average import duty for these is 32%, with import quotas for meat products, 
which will remain until 2009, after which Russia will re-evaluate their necessity and 
conduct new negotiations with its trading partners. Russia will lower the import tariffs for 
agricultural materials, in which there is not enough domestic production for the needs of 
the food industry. The import tariffs are also to be lowered for some animal feed and fruits 
and vegetables that are not produced in Russia (e.g. oranges, grapes and bananas). The 
tariffs on spirits will stay at 100%, but duties on wines and some other alcoholic beverages 
                                                 
1 In another study Rutherford and Tarr (2006) focus on the regional impacts of WTO accession. This study 
shows that when the WTO accession scenario is taken into account, output of the agricultural and food 
sectors is expected to decrease in all (major) regions but Tumen. Especially in Moscow (-17.1%) and North-
West (-17.0%) food production will decrease dramatically. The expected decrease in output will in turn lead 
to a decline in employment, as well as to a decrease in exports in all regions except Tumen. 
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will be lowered within three years. As tariff reductions will be modest in general and 
reduction implemented only after a transition period, the effects of Russia's WTO 
membership on agricultural imports will be neither immediate nor dramatic. 
 In case of WTO accession, the Russian food processing industry will develop faster 
than the primary sector and continue to be oriented on markets in neighboring countries. 
Foreign investment will primarily go towards the food processing industry. To remain 
competitive the food processors will have to invest in farms and raw material producers in 
order to ensure the quality and availability of raw material. As regards these primary 
products, Russian producers will face more competition from imports in beef and poultry, 
fruit and vegetables. Russia is expected to increase production towards self-sufficiency in 
sugar and pig meat. Grain (wheat, feed barley and rye), oilseeds (sunflower oil and 
rapeseeds) will remain important export products, although the Russian government 
sometimes creates obstacles for grain exports by introducing export duties for wheat and 
rye. 
 Some argue that Russia should anticipate WTO accession by focusing on national 
product differentiation. Russian agricultural producers will be able to cope better with 
liberalisation and integration into the world economy if 'the valuable attributes of 
domestically produced products differ from those of imported products of the same kind' 
(Weber, 2003). But again, Russian farmers will only profit from trade liberalisation if their 
products are able to compete in terms of price, quality and consistency of supply (Agra 
Europe, 2007). On the other hand, Russia will probably lose if it will not join the WTO. 
This is mainly because it will have to pay higher prices for food imports due to the 
removal of export subsidies. 
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6. Scenarios for development in the Russian agri-food 
sector 
 
 
This chapter evaluates future expectations for the agricultural development in Russia. The 
first part of the chapter reports on several model projections of future global supply and 
demand developments, and the implications for Russian agriculture net trade position. 
Basic assumptions underlying the model calculations are described and the outcomes are 
presented. The second part of the chapter reports on future development assessment based 
on a survey with Russian and Dutch entrepreneurs and other experts. A final section of this 
chapter wraps up with some conclusions. 
 
 
6.1 Model projections 
 
Projections of agricultural world markets, prepared jointly by the OECD and the FAO in 
the Agricultural Outlook 2006-2015 are set against a macroeconomic background of 
sustained optimism. The global economy has been expanding at a pace greater than 4% per 
year over the past four years, with economic growth expected to become more broad-based 
over the medium term, along with slower global population growth and continuing low 
inflation. The growth potential of the large developing economies has made them key 
drivers of global economic growth. They play an expanding role in the world trade of 
agricultural commodities and make up an increasing share of global food demand. 
Economic growth in Russia is expected to slow down but remains robust over the period 
until 2015, driven by high oil revenues. As the WTO negotiations on the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) have not yet come to a conclusion, the Outlook is based on 
existing trade and agricultural policies, and any future changes that have already been 
decided. Specifically, the outlook projections assume that trade policies as agreed in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) will hold for the entire period to 
2015.  
 The main trends in commodity markets projected in the OECD/FAO Outlook show 
Russia to remain an important importer. Despite the 2003 imposed tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs) on meat imports and growing domestic production, Russia continues to be a large 
market for beef, pork and poultry exports from the EU and Brazil, in particular. Russia is 
expected to remain (with China and Mexico) among the world's largest poultry importers 
as rising income increases demand even faster than projected growth of domestic 
production. A similar trend can be observed for milk and dairy products: strong 
consumption growth in Russia leads to rising butter, cheese and milk powder imports over 
the projected period. Further, Russia is expected to remain the major importer of raw sugar 
in the world. On the other hand, Russia's exports of grains will grow, both for wheat and 
for coarse grains for which major markets are found in North-Africa, Middle East and 
China. 
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 FAPRI (2006) projections do not differ much from the OECD/FAO estimations in 
terms of tendencies and net-trade positions. FAPRI forecasts Russian's increasing net-
export positions for wheat and feed grains, and expects the country will remain a main 
importer of sugar, dairy and meat products. Compared to OECD/FAO calculations, 
FAPRI, however, estimates a slower increase of dairy imports, expecting that the growth 
in milk production in Russia would be strong enough to catch up with the country's growth 
in consumption of all dairy products except for cheese. The latter's import will increase by 
a quarter over the next decade, supplied mainly by Ukraine.  
 Own (LEI) calculations based on a general equilibrium model1 simulate the impact 
of a scenario of 'unchanged policies' and a scenario of 'complete liberalisation' implying a 
complete removal of domestic and trade support measures for agriculture in the world. The 
outcomes of these simulations with respect to Russia's net trade positions largely confirm 
the OECD/FAO and FAPRI projections. The calculations under the unchanged policy 
scenario point at rather high production growth in the milk and meat sector resulting in 
higher self-sufficiency rates and a fall in imports. Yet, the model simulations also indicate 
that Russia will remain a significant importer of livestock products, especially of pig and 
poultry meat. For a category of 'other crops'2 Russia is and will remain an important 
importer. Also for fruits and vegetables Russia produces less than its internal demand, 
resulting in a significant inflow of these two product categories. A scenario in which all 
support for agriculture is being removed indicates that, compared to the 'unchanged 
policies' scenario, Russia's GDP growth will only marginally grow as agriculture (and the 
food industry) is just a small sector of the country's economy. In terms of production and 
trade effects, Russia's production and exports of cereals and oilseeds, and of beef will 
increase with full liberalisation, indicating where Russia's comparative advantage lie in the 
agricultural sector. The production in horticulture, of dairy and other (pig and poultry) 
meat will not change much. Yet, especially the imports of pig and poultry meat will 
increase more as well as the category of 'other products' which mainly contains processed 
products and beverages. 
 Conclusions from the model projections are that Russia will remain an (net) exporter 
of cereals and oilseeds, but for practically all other main categories of agricultural products 
the country will be less than self-sufficient. For those products Russia will (remain to) be 
an attractive export market for competitive suppliers from outside the country.  
 
 
6.2 Future market expectations based on a Russian Agribusiness Questionnaire  
 
Survey design 
In order to estimate the perspectives of Russia's agri-food sector, among 65 (mainly 
Russian) representatives of various branches of agri-business (heads of the companies and 
of the marketing/analytical divisions of the companies, 80% of respondents), independent 
analysts and governmental officers were interviewed in the fall of 2006. A formal 
                                                 
1 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). For an application, description of the model and database used, see 
for instance J. Francois et al., (2005). 
2 Other than cereals, oilseeds, sugar beet, fruits and vegetables. This category includes a heterogeneous set of 
products among which animal feedstuff, cotton and flowers. 
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questionnaire was used, covering three groups of issues: (1) an estimation of previous 
development trends in the sector; (2) the outlook for sector's short and mid-term 
development, and (3) estimates of the domestic policies impact on the sector.  
 
Trends in previous years 
It is not surprising that ¾ of the respondents have pointed out rapid growth in their markets 
in the last 2-3 years, seen the recent growth figures for the entire economy as well as in the 
agri-food sector. Almost all of them explain the growth by the increase in the domestic 
food demand, due to general rise in household incomes.  
 The Russian agribusiness interviewees showed much concern about the increase of 
imports after their significant fall in 1998-1999. Of course, imports affect product markets 
differently, yet more than half of experts estimated import effects as very strong 
(especially in the sugar, and in the fruit and vegetable sectors), while around 30% 
evaluated the impact as moderate. On the contrary, export results did not play an important 
role in the sector's development: only 17% of the interviewees noticed the (positive) 
effects of international market developments on their business. These respondents are 
largely in the grain, oilseeds and poultry sectors. 
 
Outlook on short and medium term 
The experts were asked about their forecast of the short (2-3 years) and medium (10 years) 
market perspectives. A great majority of the respondents predicts a further growth in the 
agri-food markets both inside Russia and in the world. For Russia the forecasts are even 
more optimistic than for the world and for mid-term more optimistic than for 2-3 years. 
The optimistic outlook of the market actors towards market growth can positively affect 
their investment strategy in the nearest future. 
 Driving force behind market developments in the first years to come is again the 
domestic demand, fueled by income increase and growth in non-food use of agricultural 
products (as feed due to a further growth in the livestock sector, and as input for energy 
production). At the same time the experts foresee growth in the external demand, hoping 
for expanding agri-food exports.  
 In assessing the driving forces in the future the experts of almost all sub-sectors 
indicate an increased dependence on international development - prices, demand and trade 
liberalisation. Russian major export commodity is sunflower seeds, and therefore the 
experts of this sector regard the world market situation as critical to its development 
perspectives. Grain is also a strong export-oriented commodity, however, the experts 
consider an increase in the domestic non-food use (for feed needs) equally important as an 
increase in international prices. Growth of consumer incomes in the next decade is 
believed to be a strong driving force for most products, yet most notably for livestock 
products and oilseeds. 
 Policy considerations are more important for the Russian experts in their projections 
than in retrospection: much more respondents pointed at the macroeconomic situation and 
agri-food policy affecting future market growth than in the estimates of the market 
development in the last 2-3 years. 
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Policies 
The experts were asked to estimate the most important policy measures for market 
development. These measures were grouped into 4 clusters of federal policy: 
macroeconomic, trade, administrative and agri-food policies. The questionnaire indicates 
that trade policy is considered mostly important while administrative regulation is the least 
important. 
 As it was mentioned above most market actors are concerned about the increase of 
import competition while in most sub-sectors exports are not a driving force (yet) for 
sector development. In accordance with that, 28% of the respondents would like the 
government to increase import protection (especially in the sugar and all livestock sectors), 
19% of them wait for export subsidies, while 14% request for abolishment of export taxes. 
The respondents were allowed to give extended response for these questions. The majority 
of such responses were related to the mechanism of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for meat and 
poultry: the experts are not satisfied with these quotas and suggested various ways to 
improve them. Another notable remark requests not to use trade policy for political 
purposes, something that has very often happened in Russia in last several years. 
 Within macroeconomic policy the experts are mostly concerned with pricing in the 
so called natural monopolies: energy suppliers and railway companies. The prices of 
energy and rail transport are regulated by the state. However, these prices have increased 
much more than the average inflation rate and, in particular, more than agricultural prices. 
This disparity gradually affects the margins of agribusiness companies negatively. The 
interviewees show less concern with taxes than with pricing in the natural monopolies. 
Rubble strengthening is also a serious concern of the companies because it causes growth 
of imports and hampers exports. 
 Among extended responses the most often are the recommendations to simplify the 
present tax system, especially the system of reimbursement of VAT for exporters (what is 
more relevant to trade policy). Also several respondents are concerned with low level of 
contract enforcement, low level of security for investors and other legal institutes' 
underdevelopment. 
 Most experts consider agri-food policy as a budget spending, requesting for 
increased expenditures regardless the mechanisms of this spending. Nevertheless, some of 
the respondents pointed out the necessity to develop rural infrastructure, in particular on 
roads, and to invest in agricultural education and research. It is worth to note that 
governmental officers stand for increased budget spending for the sector more often than 
other respondents: this measure was pointed out by only 25% of overall experts and by 
38% of the governmental officers in the sample. 
 Among administrative measures the experts have pointed out most of all a reduction 
of excessive administrative control over the business and an improvement of the land 
property right system. Administrative control over the business has been notably increased 
in recent years and has created a serious barrier for the sector development. New land 
legislation, which came in force in 2002-03, caused tremendous transaction costs on the 
land market what literally stopped land exchange in agriculture. One third of the 
respondents indicate this as a serious problem of the current administrative policy. 
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General outlook assessments based on the Russian survey 
The survey indicates great optimism amongst leading Russian agribusiness representatives 
and agri-food market analysts. They assess the Russia's agricultural sector will develop 
dynamically in the years to come and demonstrate increased competitiveness on the 
domestic and world markets. Modernisation and restructuring in the food industry will be 
coupled with sector consolidation, in terms of vertical and horizontal concentration. The 
agri-food sector is expected to attract more and more domestic and international 
investments, which will facilitate rapid growth. The sector will increasingly work with the 
growing network of the modern retailing sector, which has shown rapid development in 
Russia in the last several years. 
 Further increase in domestic demand for food is expected, yet the growth rate may 
level off by slow growth in incomes of the lowest income groups of population (with high 
food demand elasticity) and a faster growth of prices for housing and other prior services. 
Export opportunities will be greatly determined by world agricultural policy development 
in post-Doha situation. Russian agro-food exports will benefit from a Doha round that 
concludes with a further liberal agricultural agreement. If the Doha round fails and brings 
the world to a new wave of protectionism or regionalism, Russian exporters may find 
much less possibilities to expand on international markets. 
 Grain (wheat, feed barley and to a minor extent rye), sunflower seeds, vegetable oil, 
partially rapeseeds and flax will remain the major cash crops with a moderate to strong 
position on the world markets. Vegetable and potatoes production will slowly shift back 
from households to the larger, professional producers. Poultry and hog breeding will 
continue to grow, though most probable at a lower speed than now. The dairy sector will 
move to the Far East in perspective of growing markets in South-East Asia. Most probable 
that primary dairy production and fodder production for the dairy sector will attract 
Chinese laborers (recently labor immigration for agriculture from China to Far East was 
eased by Russian legislation). Compared to other livestock sectors, the beef sector has 
moderate perspectives in Russia. 
 
 
6.3 Market outlook through Dutch eyes 
 
Next to the questionnaire to Russian agribusiness representatives, policy makers and 
market analysts, semi-structured interviews were conducted with Dutch entrepreneurs with 
trade relations with Russia and/or already locally operating in the country through foreign 
investments. These interviews, supplemented with extensive talks with some Russian 
entrepreneurs and market analysts, also provide useful information about and insights in 
the market developments in Russia for the years to come. The report of these interviews 
below is structured along the lines of the sub-sectors.  
 Companies interviewed in the dairy sector have a rather positive view on market 
prospects. They indicate that the dairy industry expands due to growth in demand. 
Companies expect that growth in consumption of cheese, yoghurt (drinks) and other 
desserts will continue over the next years. The up-coming middle class in Russia 
stimulates the growth of dairy products with value-added. Especially, the market for fresh 
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products offers the dairy industry great opportunities. The market for long-life products is, 
however, not expected to show much further increase.  
 With respect to the meat markets, interviewees emphasize that Russia is presently far 
from self-sufficient and is importing significant quantities of beef, pig and poultry meat. 
Interviewees operating in this market do not expect that these rates will increase rapidly. 
They see good prospects for expansion of production - and indicate they anticipate further 
investments in processing and farming capacities (vertical integration). Yet, production 
increase is probably not quick enough to catch up with consumption growth. At the same 
time, import restrictions (through import quota and high out-quota tariff rates) hamper the 
inflow of beef, pork and poultry meat. The result will be that prices for meat will remain 
relatively high in Russia. Current prices for pork (per kg live weight), for example, are 20-
50% higher than in the Netherlands.  
 Interviews confirm the positive outlook for cereals and oilseed crops indicated by the 
model projections. Production of cereals is expected to increase, mainly because of higher 
yields, from 75 million ton (in 2006) to 90 million ton in 2010, which makes Russia a 
significant exporter of cereals (wheat and barley). Oilseed production is expected to 
growth even more than cereals: the production of sunflower may go up by 10-15% to reach 
7-8 million ton in 2010, while the production of rapeseed - only 0.35 million ton in 2005 - 
is expected to 'explode' and reach levels ranging between 1.5 and 3.0 million ton in 2010. 
The rapid and significant increase in rapeseed production is caused by strong demand in 
Europe (mainly Germany) for the production of bio-diesel.  
 With respect to other crops (fruit, vegetables, potatoes), the interviews point at the 
shortage in supply of fresh and quality products. The climate in Russia is also not very 
suitable for many fruit and vegetables. Greenhouse production of these products is not 
profitable due to high energy prices. The area under glass is even declining because many 
greenhouses are located close to urban areas, making them attractive for construction sites. 
While potatoes and vegetables like carrots and cabbages are sourced mainly domestically, 
supermarkets indicate that they largely (have to) rely on imports for the rest of products in 
the fruit and vegetable category. 
 Interviews indicate that market perspectives for potatoes are good, in particular for 
potato growing for processing. While a large part of the population used to cultivate 
potatoes for own use (in gardens), consumers in the larger cities now increasingly buy 
potatoes in shops and markets. Furthermore, demand for potato products (e.g. chips and 
crisps) is increasing rapidly - Euromonitor (2006) figures the chip market will grow 62% 
in the next five years. Current processing capacity and supply of good quality potatoes for 
processing are not able to cover domestic demand, illustrated by significant imports of 
potatoes for processing from several countries (a.o. Netherlands). Efforts of the industry to 
encourage Russian farmers to grow (more) chips potatoes, for instance by offering pre-
payment and pre-financing seed potatoes, has not had much success. Russian farmers in 
general lack the organisational skills and the cultivating knowledge to run a (chips) potato 
farm successfully. 
 With the increased investments in the expansion of agricultural production - both 
from private sources and from the State through the National development program - there 
is a need for all kind of inputs. New buildings (e.g. cowsheds, modern housing for hogs 
and poultry, barns) are established and old ones are being renovated. There is a need for up 
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to date interior equipment of the farms, such as milking equipment, storage and cooling 
facilities. In the animal sector there is strong demand for expanding stocks with a genetic 
mark-up. Improvements in yields need investments in better quality of seeds, semen, 
animal feed, agricultural machinery, etceteras. Next to these hard ware type of 
investments, 'soft ware' such as management assistance, training, advice, and knowledge 
exchange will contribute importantly to improved performance of the Russian agricultural 
and food industry. These all provides much opportunity for input and service supplying 
industries, both domestic and foreign companies.  
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7. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
 
This chapter concludes the study by identifying the most important opportunities and some 
threats or insecurities when operating on the Russian agri-food markets for the Dutch 
agribusiness. Moreover, some recommendations on the supportive role of Dutch 
government are formulated.  
 
 
7.1 Opportunities for Dutch agribusiness 
 
The foregoing analyses of the present state and future outlook of Russia's major food 
markets indicate many prospects for both companies operating in the consumer product 
market segments as well as in the business supplying segments. Although economic 
growth in Russia has been projected to slow in the years to come, growth will still be 
robust. Furthermore, with economic growth continuing for several years, an increasing part 
of the population will improve their standard of living. Russia's growing middle income 
class will become more discerning and will demand more varied and higher quality food 
products. This development offers many opportunities for those Dutch companies able to 
provide the products that are in demand, whether this is on the dairy, meat or other 
consumer-ready food products. As many Dutch companies have much experience in and 
have shown to be able to compete at international markets, they have good prospects to 
benefit from an increasing demand for food products in Russia in the years to come. 
 In the same vein, investments by private companies (both from inside and outside 
the agricultural sector) and through government priority programs for agriculture to 
encourage primary production offer huge possibilities for supplying industries. National 
projects are focusing on the livestock sectors. Farmers and agricultural companies can get 
support in reconstructing animal housing and barns, or in investing in new buildings. 
These construction works need interior equipment such as a milk parlor and feed devises. 
Government investment programs in the sector aiming at increasing the production of milk 
and meat also require investments in the number and the productive potential of animals. 
Imports of highly productive animals - for quick results - or semen to improve the genetic 
performance of existing breeds on the longer term will help to realize the goal of 
production increase. At the same time, the sector increasingly needs high quality 
compound feed, improved management skills and up to date technical knowledge with 
respect to animal husbandry. Obviously, investments in the Russian livestock sector offer 
many opportunities to exporters of inputs from the Netherlands or through Dutch 
companies producing the required inputs locally. 
 The interviews with Dutch entrepreneurs provide several examples of how their 
companies successfully benefit from the opportunities the Russian market offer them. 
Many chances can be found in the livestock chain, due to consumer demand developments 
and linked to the government's national program for development of the agro-industrial 
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complex. Yet, there is also ample opportunity in the crop sector. This is what speakers at a 
ZMP-Osteuopaforum1 in October 2006 also emphasized, claiming that strong investment 
efforts were needed in the modernisation of the storage and processing of fruit, vegetables 
and potatoes. For the Dutch horticulture supplying industry, with its strong international 
position in greenhouse construction, production technology and post-harvest handling, 
Russia can offer generous prospects. This also holds for Dutch companies specialized in 
potato seeds and other sector specific inputs (machinery, storage equipment, etc.). Until 
now the majority of vegetable and potato-growing was small-scale and of a semi-
subsistence type, but interviewees pointed at the fact that large-scale profession production 
units are developing, at least in potato growing. These farms would be interested to invest 
in upgrading their production and post-harvest technology, and therefore a potential client 
for Dutch supply in this area. 
 Of course, next to opportunities the agribusiness also has to take into account 
possible threats, or options that may affect the business negatively. Trade opportunities 
may decline in case Russian trade policy does not comply with WTO trade rules. Prospects 
for foreign investment are to be lowered if the Russian government puts in place market 
entry barriers to foreign direct investors. One major issue is whether Russia will be able to 
sustain economic growth in the years to come. Recent economic performance of the 
country has been strongly linked to the exploration of oil and natural gas resources. Now 
the challenge of the Russian government is to diversify the economy to sustain growth by 
encouraging increased investments in other parts of the economy. OECD (2006a) points at 
necessary structural reforms in the areas of labor markets, tax policies, and a prudent 
macroeconomic - particularly fiscal - policy in order to provide the conditions needed to 
sustain economic growth over the long run. Such reforms and policies will also help to 
manage both inflation and exchange rate pressures, now prevalent due to accumulating 
external surpluses. Economic growth may also be endangered by the high level of 
government interventions - bureaucracy - and the opportunities for corruption and rent-
seeking. Public administration reforms aimed at reducing these obstacles for investment 
are necessary conditions for sustained growth of the Russian economy. 
 
 
7.2 Doing business in Russia - do's and don'ts 
 
The interviews provided a series of suggestions for potential newcomers in the country, 
indicating important 'do's and don'ts' for companies considering to start operational 
activities in either trade or production in Russia. These suggestions are summarized and 
elaborated below. 
 The interviewees pointed at the advantages of becoming a local player, instead of 
focusing on exporting to Russia from the Netherlands or any other country. Main reasons 
for this are the following: 
                                                 
1 ZMP Osteuropaforum October 2006, Russland bracht noch riesige Investitionen in de Landwirtschaft. See 
http://www.zmp.de/info/messen/06_10_19_Osteuropaforum.asp. 
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- Russia is a large consumer market with over 140 million inhabitants, where income 
per capita has increased strongly in recent years - certainly in a number of regions - 
and where consumers show increasing demand for quality products.  
- There is always the threat that the Russian government imposes (additional) import 
barriers, or closes the market completely. History tells that decision making about 
the implementing new or additional requirements on imports is not always 
transparent, and very difficult to anticipate.  
- Import demand may decline in the future when the Russian agricultural sector 
increases its level of production. 
- A prerequisite for doing business in Russia is having a trustworthy relationship with 
your client. Therefore, you need to be in country. Business is based on personal 
relationships. 
 
 Considering investing in local production, the interviewees stress that the set up of 
greenfield locations is expensive, as more permits are required (than for existing buildings 
and constructions) and infrastructure (roads, gas pipelines) has to be built. On the other 
hand, a local government can support greenfield investments. For instance, in Belgorod the 
governor takes care of the infrastructure, which makes it attractive for companies to start 
greenfield operations. So, the situation differs at regional level. At the same time, 
interviewees indicate that wherever a potential investor considers to invest, he needs to 
have a base or a representative in Moscow: 'In an extreme centralistic country as Russia, 
you need to be in Moscow when you want to do business - for contacts with market and 
(especially) with government officials.' 
 Companies considering entering the country have to decide whether they want to 
operate on their own or connect with Russian counterparts. The interviews show a nuanced 
picture, but largely recommend the smaller end medium-sized companies to look for a 
reliable partner. Furthermore, new companies entering the local market are discouraged to 
run a business without Russian locals as the latter speak the language and know the 
business culture best. Some interview responses underlining this are: 
- 'When running a business in Russia it is crucial to have Russians running the sales 
department and front office. They can 'organise' that deliveries are being paid, 
generate contacts and build trust with clients. Russians do not easily buy from 
Westerners, yet the latter can play their role as expert'; 
- 'For doing business, a local partner is required. Local contacts are crucial important 
as a foreign company has to have people dealing with the administrative aspects of 
doing business. It is quite difficult to find your way in these spheres'; 
- 'Background check upon potential partner is important - who are you dealing with? 
At the same time, structures of cooperation need to be well defined and checked. Too 
little attention paid to this will lead to failures and frustrations.' 
 
 A general complain of the industry and traders is that bureaucracy is endemic in 
Russia, offering great opportunities for corruption practises - which appear to be 
widespread, as anecdotal evidence indicates. Interviewees stress that it is far from easy to 
get the required import licenses, product registrations, permits for investments and so on in 
Russia; in order to get things done, companies may need to be prepared to 'stimulate' the 
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officials to process the paperwork. This kind of informal costs can be rather high. A way to 
deal with this is building up good relations with local, regional and national authorities. 
Statements from interviewees underlining that for a successful operation at the local 
market good contacts with local and the national authorities are very important, are: 
- 'The experiences of foreign companies already active in the Russian market show 
that it is advisable to establish good contacts with regional governments in order to 
ensure oneself of their support so that investments and production processes will be 
free of interferences';  
 
 A serious bottleneck for foreign investors is to find well-qualified local staff and to 
ensure that this staff stays with the company for a number of years. To find and keep well-
skilled workers in, the company needs investments in personnel, training, and in well and 
timely payment. Russians are rather opportunistic, and - especially in Moscow - will leave 
as soon as they can earn more in another company. The Russian economy is growing 
quickly and offers many opportunities, especially to young and high-skilled employees.  
 Further, companies already operating in Russia recommend newcomers to develop a 
long term strategy: apply a time horizon of several years and do not shy away for the 
bottlenecks that will certainly arise in the short run. And a last recommendation is to 
inform you as much as possible by those with experience in trading with and investment in 
Russia. The Dutch agricultural attaché in Moscow has an extended list of potential 
contacts.  
 
 
7.3 Supportive role of Dutch government 
 
The Dutch agribusiness can use the services of the Dutch agricultural attaché and his staff, 
based in Moscow. The interviewees generally showed great appreciation for the work of 
the attaché's office's services. In discussing their expectations and wishes for support from 
the Dutch government, and in particular from the attaché, a number of suggestions were 
proposed, listed under three headings: 
- Trouble shooting, mainly with respect to problems concerning imports; 
- Networking: laying contacts with government officials and local businesses, match-
making on business mission, fairs, et cetera.; 
- Provide market information: execute (or assign) market studies and statistical 
overviews; basic and practical information on 'doing business in Russia' covering 
issues as taxes, legislation, certificates, culture, et cetera.). 
 
 For each heading, the issues raised are further detailed and illustrated. 
 
Trouble shooting 
- Solve problems with import (e.g. incomplete documents, clarify new regulations, et 
cetera.); 
- Intermediate in business disputes, if necessary and appropriate. Important are the 
linkages with top officials, for attaché it is crucial to 'master' these environments. 
Interviewees indicate that corruption cases should only be dealt with at high 
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Ministerial and Government level, yet there could be role for Embassy and 
agricultural attaché. 
 
Networking 
- Good contacts at high ministerial level are crucial (see previous point); 
- To exploit the generally good reputation (know-how) of Dutch companies and 
entrepreneurs, the agricultural attaché should organize study tours and seminars and 
could play an active role in introducing Dutch entrepreneurs at Russian companies. 
In organizing business trips to relevant regions, the agricultural attaché is expected to 
ensure that key regional players will be met, and that he provides background 
material such as statistics; 
- The PSOM- and PESP programme provides a good opportunity for small and 
medium-sized Dutch companies to cooperate with Russian partners. The agricultural 
attaché could be a more pro-active intermediate to match both sides (for up to date 
information on possibilities to use these programmes, see EVD website in annex 1); 
- Germany (as well as France) provides good examples of support to exporters doing 
business in Russia by providing investment and export insurances. Atradius (new 
name for NCM) does not provide such support, but it could be an instruments that 
might encourage trade and investment relations substantially; 
- Relevant contacts should be provided by the attaché - concrete names of relevant 
people and companies, both at the Dutch side (list of Ducth companies in the 
country, list of Dutch companies potentially interested) and at the Russian side; 
- The attaché should link requests of serious, reputable, strong Russian firms to the 
relevant Dutch companies - for specific sectors; 
- The attaché could provide access to a network of existing Dutch entrepreneurs; 
- NL could sponsor a Dutch corner at trade fairs (the Germans, the Spanish have done 
so during the recent Golden Autumn Fair in Moscow) - interesting is an integrated 
chain perspective: providing all the different Dutch services and products required in 
the chain (integrated approach, complete package of services) 
 
Market information 
- Statistics are not readily available - should be provided, on a regular basis and on 
demand by the agricultural attaché; 
- Sector studies could help to orientate interested entrepreneurs (example: Dairy Year 
book of World Bank project, another example fruit sector study of USAID); 
- The attaché could provide assistance to legal matters - e.g. providing an answer to 
the polemic if only Russian or also international contracts are valid in Russia - they 
could supply a valid standard contract, yet also providing contacts of reputable legal 
advisors; 
- The attaché could provide information on GOS certificates - merely a bureaucratic 
yet crucial document - how to get them, which route needs to be followed; 
- The attaché could provide information on Russian tax system on how to deal with it; 
- All the above would create an attaché that functions as a help desk for Dutch 
agricultural entrepreneurs. 
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Appendix 1. Useful websites 
 
 
 
- Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition 
http://www.bof.fi/bofit_en/index.htm  
- Economische Voorlichtingsdienst (EVD) - Landenpagina Rusland  
http://www.evd.nl/info/landen/land.asp?land=rsf  
- Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) 
http://www.fsgs.ru/wps/portal/english 
- Institute for Agricultural Market Studies (IKAR) 
http://www.ikar.ru/eng/ 
- Institute for the Economy in Transition - Analytical Centre Agri-food Economics 
http://www.iet.ru/afe/english/1page.html 
- Lappeenranta University of Technology - Northern Dimension Research Centre 
(Finland) 
http://www.lut.fi/nordi/ 
- Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in the Netherlands 
http://www.rustrade.nl/ 
- U.S. Department of Agriculture in Russia (United States) 
http://eng.usda.ru/ 
- Organization for Economic Development and cooperation (OECD) 
http://oecd.org 
- World Bank 
http://worldbank.org 
- World Trade Organsiation (WTO) 
http://wto.org 
